Brams Rational Politics

Decisions, Games, and Strategy
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-5857-7
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 248 Seiten, Web PDF

Rational Politics: Decisions, Games, and Strategy focuses on the unified presentation of politics as a rational human activity, including the paradox of voting and proportional representation. The publication first offers information on the study of rational politics, political intrigue in the Bible, and candidate strategies. Topics include the factor of timing in presidential primaries, rational positions in a multicandidate race, primacy of issues and their spatial representation, and politics in the story of Esther. The text then elaborates on voting paradoxes and the problems of representation, voting power, and threats and deterrence. Discussions focus on a sequential view of the Cuban missile crisis, use of threat power in Poland, power anomalies in the European Community Council of Ministers, probability of the paradox of voting, empirical examples of the paradox of voting, and problems in achieving proportional representation. The book is a valuable reference for researchers interested in rational politics.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Brams, Steven J.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Rational Politics: Decisions, Games, and Strategy;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;10
5;Preface;6
6;Figures and Tables;14
7;Chapter 1. The Study of Rational Politics;16
8;Chapter 2. Political Intrigue in the Bible: Esther;22
8.1;2.1 Introduction;22
8.2;2.2 The Demise of Queen Vashti;23
8.3;2.3 Esther's Intercession;29
8.4;2.4 Vindication;32
8.5;2.5 Politics in Esther;35
8.6;2.6 Ethics in Esther;36
9;Chapter 3. Candidate Strategies;40
9.1;3.1 Introduction;40
9.2;3.2 The Primacy of Issues and Their Spatial Representation;41
9.3;3.3 Rational Positions in a Two-Candidate Race;44
9.4;3.4 Rational Positions in a Multicandidate Race;47
9.5;3.5 The Winnowing-Out Process in Presidential Primaries;51
9.6;3.6 The Factor of Timing in Presidential Primaries;56
9.7;3.7 Fuzzy Candidate Positions and Voter Alienation;59
9.8;3.8 Conclusions;63
10;Chapter 4. Voting Paradoxes and Problems of Representation;68
10.1;4.1 Introduction;68
10.2;4.2 The Paradox of Voting;68
10.3;4.3 Arrow's General Possibility Theorem;73
10.4;4.4 Relaxing Arrow's Conditions;75
10.5;4.5 Probability of the Paradox of Voting;80
10.6;4.6 Empirical Examples of the Paradox of Voting;82
10.7;4.7 The Monotonicity Paradox;86
10.8;4.8 Problems in Achieving Proportional Representation;90
10.9;4.9 The Apportionment Problem;94
10.10;4.10 Conclusions;97
11;Chapter 5. Voting Power;106
11.1;5.1 Introduction;106
11.2;5.2 The Paradox of the Chair's Position;107
11.3;5.3 The Chair's Counterstrategy of Deception;110
11.4;5.4 Banzhaf Voting Power;113
11.5;5.5 The Paradox of New Members;114
11.6;5.6 Power Anomalies in the European Community Council of Ministers;116
11.7;5.7 Conclusions;120
12;Chapter 6. Threats and Deterrence;124
12.1;6.1 Introduction;124
12.2;6.2 The Use of Threat Power in Poland, 1980-1981;125
12.3;6.3 The Cuban Missile Crisis as a Game of Chicken;131
12.4;6.4 Deception and Power in the Cuban Missile Crisis;137
12.5;6.5 A Sequential View of the Cuban Missile Crisis;140
12.6;6.6 Nonmyopic Equilibria and the Theory of Moves: The Search for Farsighted Solutions;143
12.7;6.7 Conclusions;148
13;Chapter 7. Traps: No-Win Situations;154
13.1;7.1 Introduction;154
13.2;7.2 Prisoners' Dilemma;156
13.3;7.3 The Superpower Arms Race as a Prisoners' Dilemma;161
13.4;7.4 Consequences of Mutual Predictability in Prisoners' Dilemma;166
13.5;7.5 The Superpower Arms Race as a Two-Stage Prisoners' Dilemma;168
13.6;7.6 The Effects of Power in Prisoners' Dilemma;171
13.7;7.7 The White House Tapes Case: The Players and Their Preferences;172
13.8;7.8 The White House Tapes Case: The Trap;179
13.9;7.9 Conclusions;182
14;Chapter 8. Coalitions;190
14.1;8.1 Introduction;190
14.2;8.2 Political Parties as Coalitions;191
14.3;8.3 Reconciling the Conflicting Interests within Parties;192
14.4;8.4 Optimal Candidate Positions in a Campaign;193
14.5;8.5 Optimal Positions in Actual Presidential Campaigns;196
14.6;8.6 The Size Principle;199
14.7;8.7 Applications of the Size Principle to Politics;203
14.8;8.8 An Alternative Goal: Maximizing One's Shar of Spoils;205
14.9;8.9 The Bandwagon Curve;210
14.10;8.10 Conclusions;214
15;Chapter 9. Strategy and Ethics;218
16;Glossary;224
17;Bibliography;230
18;Index;240