Buch, Englisch, 240 Seiten, Previously published in hardcover, Format (B × H): 160 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 421 g
Causal Objections to Platonism
Buch, Englisch, 240 Seiten, Previously published in hardcover, Format (B × H): 160 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 421 g
Reihe: The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science
ISBN: 978-90-481-5836-2
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
This book will be of particular interest to researchers and advanced students of epistemology and of the philosophy of mathematics and science. It will also be of interest to all philosophers with a general interest in metaphysics and ontology.
Zielgruppe
Research
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Rechtswissenschaften Recht, Rechtswissenschaft Allgemein Rechtsphilosophie, Rechtsethik
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Metaphysik, Ontologie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschaftsphilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Rechtsphilosophie, Rechtsethik
- Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften: Allgemeines Wissenschaften: Theorie, Epistemologie, Methodik
Weitere Infos & Material
1. Platonism and Causality.- 2. Beliefs and Facts.- 3. Beliefs and Causes.- 4. The Case for a Causal Connection.- 5. Is a Causal Connection Necessary for Knowledge?.- 6. Other Theories of Knowledge.- 7. Existence Claims and Causality.- 8. The Burden of Proof.- 9. Platonic Knowledge by Intuition.- 10. Apriorism.- 11. Indispensability and Platonic Knowledge.- 12. Problems with Prolifigate Platonism.- Conclusion.- Appendices.- I. Does Knowledge Require Belief?.- 1.1. The traditional analysis of knowledge.- 1.2. The truth condition.- 1.3. The consistency of belief and knowledge.- 1.4. Radford’s counterexample.- 1.5. Information and knowledge.- II. Can We Choose Our Beliefs?.- II. 1. Belief-voluntarism and epistemic justification.- 11.2. Belief-voluntarism — is it possible?.- 11.3. Direct belief-voluntarism — is it actual?.- 11.4. Belief and acceptance.- 11.5. Choosing beliefs indirectly.