Buch, Englisch, 222 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 332 g
Buch, Englisch, 222 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 332 g
Reihe: Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion
ISBN: 978-1-138-88433-5
Verlag: Routledge
In this timely study, Dawes defends the methodological naturalism of the sciences. Though religions offer what appear to be explanations of various facts about the world, the scientist, as scientist, will not take such proposed explanations seriously. Even if no natural explanation were available, she will assume that one exists. Is this merely a sign of atheistic prejudice, as some critics suggest? Or are there good reasons to exclude from science explanations that invoke a supernatural agent? On the one hand, Dawes concedes the bare possibility that talk of divine action could constitute a potential explanation of some state of affairs, while noting that the conditions under which this would be true are unlikely ever to be fulfilled. On the other hand, he argues that a proposed explanation of this kind would rate poorly, when measured against our usual standards of explanatory virtue.
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Weitere Infos & Material
Acknowledgments
Chapter 1: Against Religious Explanations
Chapter 2: On Explanations in General
Chapter 3: What are Theistic Explanations?
Chapter 4: What Would They Explain?
Chapter 5: Potential Theistic Explanations
Chapter 6: Inference to the Best Explanation
Chapter 7: Successful Theistic Explanations
Chapter 8: Conclusion
Appendix: Intentional Explanations
Notes
Bibliography
Index