The Two Faces of Judicial Power

Dynamics of Judicial-Political Bargaining
1. Auflage 2021
ISBN: 978-3-030-46018-1
Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Buch, Englisch, 245 Seiten, Format (B × H): 148 mm x 210 mm, Gewicht: 346 g

This book shows that constitutional courts exercise direct and indirect power on political branches through decision-making. The first face of judicial power is characterized by courts directing political actors to implement judicial decisions in specific ways. The second face leads political actors to anticipate judicial review and draft policies accordingly. The judicial–political interaction originating from both faces is herein formally modeled. A cross-European comparison of pre-conditions of judicial power shows that the German Federal Constitutional Court is a well-suited representative case for a quantitative assessment of judicial power. Multinomial logistic regressions show that the court uses directives when evasion of decisions is costly while accounting for the government’s ability to implement decisions. Causal analyses of the second face of judicial power show that bills exposed to legal signals are drafted accounting for the court. These findings re-shape our understanding of judicialization and shed light on a silent form of judicialization.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Engst, Benjamin G.

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Studien zu einzelnen Ländern und Gebieten
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Regierungspolitik
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Internationale Beziehungen Europäische Union, Europapolitik
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. The Two Faces of Judicial Power.- 2. The Judicial-Policy-Dialog Game.- 3. Judicial Power in Germany and the European Union.- 4. The First Face of Judicial Power.- 5. The Second Face of Judicial Power.- 6. Conclusion: The Implications of Judicial Power.

Über Autor(innen)

Benjamin G. Engst is a Postdoctoral Researcher in Political Science at the University of Mannheim, Germany. He specializes in Comparative Political Institutions and Behavior and has a strong background in quantitative methods with a focus on Judicial Politics.