Buch, Englisch, 270 Seiten, Format (B × H): 229 mm x 151 mm, Gewicht: 418 g
Buch, Englisch, 270 Seiten, Format (B × H): 229 mm x 151 mm, Gewicht: 418 g
ISBN: 978-1-009-17070-3
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
This book explains how states informally regulate drug markets in Latin America. It shows how and why state actors, specifically police and politicians, confront, negotiate with, or protect drug dealers to extract illicit rents or prevent criminal violence. The book highlights how, in countries with weak institutions, police act as interlocutors between criminals and politicians. It shows that whether and how politicians control their police forces explains the prevalence of different informal regulatory arrangements to control drug markets. Using detailed case studies built on 180 interviews in four cities in Argentina and Brazil, the book reconstructs how these informal regulatory arrangements emerged and changed over time.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Regierungspolitik
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Kommunal-, Regional-, und Landesverwaltung
- Rechtswissenschaften Strafrecht Kriminologie, Strafverfolgung
- Rechtswissenschaften Öffentliches Recht Verwaltungsrecht
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Staats- und Regierungsformen, Staatslehre
Weitere Infos & Material
1. Informal regulation of criminal markets in Latin America; 2. A theory of drug market regulation; 3. Particularistic confrontation: The persistent war between gangs and police in Rio De Janeiro; 4. Particularistic negotiation: The decentralization of police corruption and increase in violence in Rosario, Santa Fe; 5. Coordinated protection: The consolidation of centralized corruption in Buenos Aires; 6. Coordinated coexistence: The consolidation of a police-gang truce in São Paulo; 7. Regulation of criminal markets in weak institutional contexts.
