Ginsburg / Rosen / Vanberg | Constitutions in Times of Financial Crisis | Buch | 978-1-108-49229-4 | sack.de

Buch, Englisch, 340 Seiten, HC gerader Rücken kaschiert, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 652 g

Reihe: Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy

Ginsburg / Rosen / Vanberg

Constitutions in Times of Financial Crisis


Erscheinungsjahr 2019
ISBN: 978-1-108-49229-4
Verlag: Cambridge University Press

Buch, Englisch, 340 Seiten, HC gerader Rücken kaschiert, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 652 g

Reihe: Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy

ISBN: 978-1-108-49229-4
Verlag: Cambridge University Press


Many constitutions include provisions intended to limit the discretion of governments in economic policy. In times of financial crises, such provisions often come under pressure as a result of calls for exceptional responses to crisis situations. This volume assesses the ability of constitutional orders all over the world to cope with financial crises, and the demands for emergency powers that typically accompany them. Bringing together a variety of perspectives from legal scholars, economists, and political scientists, this volume traces the long-run implications of financial crises for constitutional order. In exploring the theoretical and practical problems raised by the constitutionalization of economic policy during times of severe crisis, this volume showcases an array of constitutional design options and the ways they channel governmental responses to emergency.
Ginsburg / Rosen / Vanberg Constitutions in Times of Financial Crisis jetzt bestellen!

Weitere Infos & Material


1. Introduction Tom Ginsburg, Mark Rosen and Georg Vanberg; Part I. The Role of Constitutions in Dealing with Crises: 2. Financial emergencies John Ferejohn; 3. Rule-of-law objections to the lender of last resort Eric A. Posner; 4. Balanced budget provisions in constitutions Tom Ginsburg; 5. Legislatures and constitutions in times of severe financial crisis Mark D. Rosen; Part II. Courts and Crises: 6. The place of economic crisis in American constitutional law: the Great Depression as a case study Barry Cushman; 7. Financial crises and constitutional compromise Georg Vanberg and Mitu Gulati; 8. Commitment for cowards: why the judicialization of austerity is bad policy and even worse politics Daniel Kelemen; 9. Protecting fundamental rights during financial crisis: supranational adjudication in the Council of Europe Eva Brems; Part III. Supranational Governance and Crisis: 10. Constitutionalism as limitation and license: crisis governance in the European Union Turkuler Isiksel; 11. The institutional origin of Europe's constitutional crises: Grexit, Brexit and the EU form of government Federico Fabbrini; Part IV. Implementing Austerity: 12. The constitutional performance of austerity in Portugal Teresa Violante and Patrícia André; 13. Constitutional resilience and constitutional failure in the face of crisis: the Greek case Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou; Part V. The Effect of Crises on Constitutions: 14. Economic crises, political fragmentation, and constitutional choice: the agenda-setting power of presidents in Latin America Gabriel L. Negretto; 15. Constitutions, crisis, and regime change: perspectives on East and Southeast Asia Björn Dressel.


Vanberg, Georg
Georg Vanberg is Professor of Political Science and Law, and current Chair of the Department of Political Science at Duke University, North Carolina.

Rosen, Mark D.
Mark D. Rosen is University Distinguished Professor at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.

Ginsburg, Tom
Tom Ginsburg is Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago Law School.



Ihre Fragen, Wünsche oder Anmerkungen
Vorname*
Nachname*
Ihre E-Mail-Adresse*
Kundennr.
Ihre Nachricht*
Lediglich mit * gekennzeichnete Felder sind Pflichtfelder.
Wenn Sie die im Kontaktformular eingegebenen Daten durch Klick auf den nachfolgenden Button übersenden, erklären Sie sich damit einverstanden, dass wir Ihr Angaben für die Beantwortung Ihrer Anfrage verwenden. Selbstverständlich werden Ihre Daten vertraulich behandelt und nicht an Dritte weitergegeben. Sie können der Verwendung Ihrer Daten jederzeit widersprechen. Das Datenhandling bei Sack Fachmedien erklären wir Ihnen in unserer Datenschutzerklärung.