The Politics of Order in Informal Markets

Erscheinungsjahr 2022
ISBN: 978-1-108-98471-3
Verlag: Cambridge University Press

Buch, Englisch, 165 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 251 g

Reihe: Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society

Property rights are important for economic exchange, but many governments don't protect them. Private market organizations can fill this gap by providing an institutional structure to enforce agreements, but with this power comes the ability to extort group members. Under what circumstances, then, will private organizations provide a stable environment for economic activity? Based on market case studies and a representative survey of traders in Lagos, Nigeria, this book argues that threats from the government can force an association to behave in ways that promote trade. The findings challenge the conventional wisdom that private good governance in developing countries thrives when the government keeps its hands off private group affairs. Instead, the author argues, leaders among traders behave in ways that promote trade primarily because of the threat of government intrusion.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Grossman, Shelby

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Theorie, Politische Philosophie
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Regierungspolitik Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Regional- und Städtische Wirtschaft
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Wirtschaftspolitik, politische Ökonomie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. Introduction; 2. Market Associations: An Overview; 3. Conducting a Representative Survey of Informal Traders; 4. A Calm Sea Does Not Make a Good Sailor: A Theory of Private Good Governance; 5. Government Threats and Group Leader Strength; 6. Business is Secret: Government Threats and Within-Group Competition; 7. Private Groups in Comparative Perspective; A. Appendix to Chapter 2 – Market Associations: An Overview; B. Appendix to Chapter 3 – Conducting a Representative Survey of Informal Traders; C. Appendix to Chapter 4 – A Calm Sea Does Not Make a Good Sailor – A Theory of Private Good Governance; D. Appendix to Chapter 6 – Government Threats and Within-Group Competition; E. Appendix to Chapter 7 – Private Groups in Comparative Perspective.

Über Autor(innen)

Grossman, Shelby
Shelby Grossman is a Research Scholar at the Stanford Internet Observatory. She holds a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University.