Hassin Rational Queueing

Erscheinungsjahr 2016
ISBN: 978-1-4987-4528-4
Verlag: CRC Press
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 392 Seiten

Understand the Strategic Behavior in Queueing Systems

Rational Queueing provides one of the first unified accounts of the dynamic aspects involved in the strategic behavior in queues. It explores the performance of queueing systems where multiple agents, such as customers, servers, and central managers, all act but often in a noncooperative manner.

The book first addresses observable queues and models that assume state-dependent behavior. It then discusses other types of information in queueing systems and compares observable and unobservable variations and incentives for information disclosure. The next several chapters present relevant models for the maximization of individual utilities, social welfare, and profits.

After covering queueing networks, from simple parallel servers to general network structures, the author describes models for planned vacations and forced vacations (such as breakdowns). Focusing on supply chain models, he then shows how agents of these models may have different goals yet they all profit when the system operates efficiently. The final chapter allows bounded rationality by lowering the assumption of fully rational agents.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Hassin, Refael

Fachgebiete

• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Unternehmensforschung
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Operations Research
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Stochastik Bayesianische Inferenz

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction
Rational queueing
Scope
Mode of description
Basic models and assumptions
Demand
Information
Social optimality
Useful concepts
Terminology conventions
Plan

Observable queues
Extensions and variations of Naor’s model
The dual approach
Allocation of heterogeneous items
Probabilistic joining
Server selection and capacity allocation
Dynamic control

Information
Queue-length-information heterogeneity
Quality-information heterogeneity and signaling
Processing-time information
Information acquisition
Information control
Environmental uncertainty
Delayed information and cheap talk
Ticket queues

Customer decisions
Temporal decisions
Joining, reneging, and jockeying
Benchmark effects
Priority purchasing, overtaking, and line-cutting
Duplicate orders
Choosing the arrival rate
Choosing the service duration

Social optimization and cooperation
Coordination by pricing
Positive network effects
Priorities
Strategies using memory
Decentralized systems
Systems with public and private service facilities
Cooperation in service systems
Efficiency and price of anarchy
Trading positions

Monopoly
Profit maximization in Naor’s model
Price and capacity
Expert systems
Subscriptions and nonlinear pricing
Providing substitute services
Priorities
Hoteling-type location models
Searching for customers

Competition
Competition when customers maximize utility
Competition with exogenous demand functions
Competition with limited cooperation
Multi-period competition
Hoteling-type models
Customer loyalty

Routing in queueing networks
Parallel servers
Queues with different regimes
Complementary services
Partial control
Routing with transportation costs
Braess-type paradoxes
The Downs–Thomson paradox

Supply chains, outsourcing, and contracting
Inventory supply chains
Service supply chains
Allocation of demand to suppliers
Competition
Internet service provision
Queueing games

Vacations
Strategic vacations
Forced vacations, breakdowns, and catastrophes
Clearing systems

Bounded rationality
Heuristic strategies
Quantal response and attraction demand functions
Quotation sensitivity
Joining and reneging

Bibliography

Subject index
Author index

Über Autor(innen)

Refael Hassin is a professor in the Department of Statistics and Operations Research at Tel Aviv University. A prominent international scholar, Dr. Hassin is well recognized for his contributions in the area of rational queueing. He has received four grants from the Israel Science Foundation to investigate strategic queueing systems. His research interests include discrete optimization and the economics of queues. He received his PhD in operations research (with distinction) from Yale University.