Arithmetic and Ontology

A Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic. Edited by Pieranna Garavaso
Erscheinungsjahr 2006
ISBN: 978-90-420-2047-4
Verlag: Brill | Rodopi

Buch, Englisch, Band 90, 393 Seiten, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 230 mm, Gewicht: 771 g

Reihe: Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities

This volume documents a lively exchange between five philosophers of mathematics. It also introduces a new voice in one central debate in the philosophy of mathematics. Non-realism, i.e., the view supported by Hugly and Sayward in their monograph, is an original position distinct from the widely known realism and anti-realism. Non-realism is characterized by the rejection of a central assumption shared by many realists and anti-realists, i.e., the assumption that mathematical statements purport to refer to objects. The defense of their main argument for the thesis that arithmetic lacks ontology brings the authors to discuss also the controversial contrast between pure and empirical arithmetical discourse. Colin Cheyne, Sanford Shieh, and Jean Paul Van Bendegem, each coming from a different perspective, test the genuine originality of non-realism and raise objections to it. Novel interpretations of well-known arguments, e.g., the indispensability argument, and historical views, e.g. Frege, are interwoven with the development of the authors’ account. The discussion of the often neglected views of Wittgenstein and Prior provide an interesting and much needed contribution to the current debate in the philosophy of mathematics.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Hugly, Philip

Sayward, Charles

Weitere Mitwirkende

Garavaso, Pieranna

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Metaphysik, Ontologie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophie der Mathematik, Philosophie der Physik
• Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften: Allgemeines Wissenschaften: Theorie, Epistemologie, Methodik
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Mathematik Allgemein Philosophie der Mathematik
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschaftsphilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Acknowledgments
Editor’s Introduction
Philip HUGLY and Charles SAYWARD: Arithmetic and Ontology a Non-Realist Philosophy of Arithmetic
Preface
Analytical
Chapter 1. Introduction
Part One: Beginning with Frege
Chapter 2. Notes to Grundlagen
Chapter 3. Objectivism and Realism in Frege’s Philosophy of Arithmetic
Part Two: Arithmetic and Non-Realism
Chapter 4. The Peano Axioms
Chapter 5. Existence, Number, and Realism
Part Three: Necessity and Rules
Chapter 6. Arithmetic and Necessity
Chapter 7. Arithmetic and Rules
Part Four: The Three Theses
Chapter 8. Thesis One
Chapter 9. Thesis Two
Chapter 10. Thesis Three
References
Commentaries
Colin Cheyne, Numbers, Reference, and Abstraction
Sanford Shieh, What Is Non-Realism about Arithmetic?
Jean Paul Van Bendegem, Non-Realism, Nominalism and Strict Fi-nitism. The Sheer Complexity of It All

Replies to Commentaries
Philip Hugly and Charles Sayward, Replies to Commentaries
About the Contributors
Index