Buch, Englisch, 336 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 497 g
Buch, Englisch, 336 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 497 g
ISBN: 978-0-19-958588-5
Verlag: OUP Oxford
A selection of notable essays on a closely linked set of topics
Jaegwon Kim has long been a leading figure in this area of philosophy
Significant for current debates in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, action theory, and philosophy of science
Jaegwon Kim presents a selection of his essays from the last two decades. The volume includes three new essays, on an agent-centered first-person account of action explanation, the concepts of realization and their bearings on the mind-body problem, and the nonexistence of laws in the special sciences. Among other topics covered are emergence and emergentism, the nature of explanation and of theories of explanation, reduction and reductive explanation, mental causation and explanatory exclusion. Kim tackles questions such as: How should we understand the concept of "emergence", and what are the prospects of emergentism as a doctrine about the status of minds? What does an agent-centered, first-person account of explanation of human actions look like? Why aren't there strict laws in the special sciences - sciences like biology, psychology, and sociology? The essays will be accessible to attentive readers without an extensive philosophical background.
Zielgruppe
Scholars and advanced students of philosophy.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Pragmatismus
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Metaphysik, Ontologie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschaftsphilosophie
Weitere Infos & Material
1: Making sense of emergence
2: The layered world: Metaphysical considerations
3: Emergence: Core ideas and issues
4: "Supervenient and yet not deducible": Is there a coherent concept of ontological emergence?
5: Reasons and the first person
6: Taking the agent's point of view seriously in action explanation
7: Explanatory realism, causal realism, and explanatory exclusion
8: Explanatory knowledge and metaphysical dependence
9: Hempel, explanation, metaphysics
10: Reduction and reductive explanation: Is one possible without the other?
11: Can supervenience and "non-strict" laws save anomalous monism?
12: Causation and mental causation
13: Two concepts of realization, mental causation, and physicalism
14: Why there are no laws in the special sciences: Three arguments
Index
