E-Book, Englisch, 308 Seiten
Reihe: ISSN
ISBN: 978-3-11-032270-5
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Epistemic Studies
.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sprachphilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophie: Allgemeines, Methoden
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophische Logik, Argumentationstheorie
- Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaften Sprachphilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Semantik & Pragmatik
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Preface;7
2;Contents;9
3;Introduction;13
4;1 What is conceptual analysis and what is the problem?;21
4.1;1.1 What is conceptual analysis?;21
4.2;1.2 From Frege to Kripke and Putnam;25
5;2 Two-dimensionalism and the necessary a posteriori;33
5.1;2.1 Two-dimensionalism;33
5.1.1;2.1.1 Primary and secondary intensions;33
5.1.2;2.1.2 Metaphysical plenitude and two-fold world dependence;37
5.1.3;2.1.3 Scrutability and canonical descriptions;42
5.1.4;2.1.4 Two-dimensionalism and Jackson’s descriptivism;46
5.1.5;2.1.5 Two notions of apriority;50
5.2;2.2 Modal illusions according to Kripke and according to twodimensionalism;54
5.2.1;2.2.1 Kripke’s two models of modal error;56
5.2.2;2.2.2 Doubts about the accounts of modal error;58
5.2.2.1;2.2.2.1 Doubts about the epistemic counterpart model;58
5.2.2.2;2.2.2.2 Doubts about the reference fixer model;65
5.3;2.3 Summary and outlook: What has been shown and what is yet to be shown;70
6;3 The challenge from the epistemic arguments;77
6.1;3.1 Primary intensions and the epistemic arguments;80
6.1.1;3.1.1 The primary intensions of natural kind terms;84
6.1.1.1;3.1.1.1 Vagueness;92
6.1.1.2;3.1.1.2 Intersubjective variation and the individuation of concepts .;94
6.1.2;3.1.2 Semantic deference and the primary intensions of names;96
6.1.2.1;3.1.2.1 The argument from Ignorance and Error;98
6.1.2.2;3.1.2.2 Deferential concepts and the alleged problem of circularity;99
6.1.2.3;3.1.2.3 Deferential concepts and apriority;104
6.1.2.4;3.1.2.4 Two methods for detecting deferential concepts and two problems for two-dimensionalism;106
6.2;3.2 Linguistic meaning, mental content, and two-dimensionalism;110
7;4 Primary intensions, defining the subject, and communication;121
7.1;4.1 Defining the subject;122
7.1.1;4.1.1 A case for the epistemic thesis;127
7.1.1.1;4.1.1.1 From (CJ) to (CJ+) – Schroeter’s improv model;129
7.1.1.2;4.1.1.2 From (CJ+) to (CJ++);145
7.1.2;4.1.2 The failure of the semantic thesis;149
7.2;4.2 Two-dimensional communication;153
7.2.1;4.2.1 The semantic thesis;156
7.2.1.1;4.2.1.1 Communication involving indexical expressions;158
7.2.1.2;4.2.1.2 Communication involving proper names;163
7.2.1.3;4.2.1.3 Communication involving natural kind terms;167
7.2.2;4.2.2 The epistemic thesis;169
7.2.2.1;4.2.2.1 The importance of shared primary intensions;170
7.2.2.2;4.2.2.2 How primary intensions help to promote co-reference even when they are not shared;175
7.2.2.2.1;4.2.2.2.1 Proper names;176
7.2.2.2.2;4.2.2.2.2 Natural kind terms;178
8;5 Epistemic transparency and epistemic opacity;181
8.1;5.1 Arguments for ubiquitous opacity;182
8.1.1;5.1.1 Millikan;183
8.1.2;5.1.2 Putnam;185
8.1.3;5.1.3 Kornblith;187
8.2;5.2 Revealing opacity;194
8.2.1;5.2.1 Revealing opacity via the function of a term;195
8.2.2;5.2.2 Revealing opacity via considerations about hypothetical cases;197
8.2.3;5.2.3 Can opacity be determined a priori?;199
8.3;5.3 The value of opaque terms in conceptual analysis;206
8.3.1;5.3.1 Discovering essences;207
8.3.2;5.3.2 Variation in primary intensions;208
9;6 Scrutability, primary intensions, and conceptual analysis;213
9.1;6.1 Scrutability and primary intensions;214
9.1.1;6.1.1 From descriptivism to the scrutability thesis;217
9.1.2;6.1.2 A case for (CJ);223
9.1.2.1;6.1.2.1 Argument from metaphysical plenitude;224
9.1.2.2;6.1.2.2 Arguments from the scrutability of specific kinds of facts .;225
9.1.2.3;6.1.2.3 Arguments from the absence of clear counterexamples;227
9.1.2.4;6.1.2.4 Arguments from the epistemic indispensability of scrutability;230
9.2;6.2 Semantic idealizations and epistemic reality;234
9.2.1;6.2.1 Are primary intensions too coarse-grained?;235
9.2.2;6.2.2 Scrutability for real subjects;239
9.2.2.1;6.2.2.1 The two-level model;245
9.2.2.2;6.2.2.2 Approaching ideal judgments;254
10;7 The trouble with definitions and the aims of conceptual analysis;261
10.1;7.1 The aims of conceptual analysis;263
10.1.1;7.1.1 Definitions – complete, partial, and absent;263
10.1.2;7.1.2 Reductive explanations;267
10.1.3;7.1.3 The Canberra Plan;274
10.1.3.1;7.1.3.1 Ramsey sentences, primary intensions and unique reference;278
10.1.3.2;7.1.3.2 The scope of the Canberra Plan;280
10.1.3.3;7.1.3.3 The practicability of the Canberra Plan;283
10.2;7.2 The trouble with definitions;286
10.2.1;7.2.1 Adequacy conditions for definitions;286
10.2.2;7.2.2 Objections to the eligibility of definitions;290
10.2.2.1;7.2.2.1 Objections from the relation between definiendum and everything else;290
10.2.2.2;7.2.2.2 Objections from the format of concepts;294
10.2.3;7.2.3 The absence of successful definitions and some reasons for optimism;297
11;8 Concluding remarks;303
12;References;309
