E-Book, Englisch, 359 Seiten, eBook
Reihe: Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI
Kontogiannis / Koutsoupias / Spirakis Algorithmic Game Theory
Erscheinungsjahr 2010
ISBN: 978-3-642-16170-4
Verlag: Springer
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010, Proceedings
E-Book, Englisch, 359 Seiten, eBook
Reihe: Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI
ISBN: 978-3-642-16170-4
Verlag: Springer
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
Zielgruppe
Research
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers.- How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard?.- A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets.- Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market.- Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games.- Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics.- Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games.- On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games.- Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games.- On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play.- On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria.- On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games.- A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium.- Responsive Lotteries.- On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users.- Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games.- A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It.- The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements.- Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting.- Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy.- Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations.- On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms.- Braess’s Paradox for Flows over Time.- The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant.- Truthful Fair Division.- No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand.- On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria.- 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties.- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear BottleneckCongestion Games.- Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games.
