Krönke Governmental Paternalism

1. Auflage 2018
ISBN: 978-3-8452-8420-0
Verlag: Nomos
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 106 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 227 mm

Who decides how the individual may live a good and reasonable life – the individual or “Father State”? “Governmental Paternalism” examines the legal limitations to paternalistic state activities under German and European law, illustrated by examples from European data protection law and social public procurement. Two types of governmental paternalism are distinguished: protective and educational paternalism. Both forms activate a different and specific legal standard, emphasising the individual’s personal autonomy and restricting any governmental interference. This shows: Only a self-determined life is a good life.
The book is a result of the international and interdisciplinary “Enhancing Life Project” of the University of Chicago, in cooperation with Ruhr University Bochum.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Krönke, Christoph

Fachgebiete

• Rechtswissenschaften Recht, Rechtswissenschaft Allgemein Rechtssoziologie, Rechtspsychologie, Rechtslinguistik
• Sozialwissenschaften Soziologie | Soziale Arbeit Spezielle Soziologie Rechtssoziologie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Cover;1
2; Governmental Paternalism: Anachronism or Future Model of Enhancing Life?;9
3; Protective Governmental Paternalism: “Data Paternalism”;15
3.1; I. What is Protective Governmental Paternalism?;18
3.1.1; 1. Governmental Paternalism;18
3.1.2; 2. Protective Governmental Paternalism;22
3.1.3; 3. Data Paternalism as an Example of Protective Paternalism;23
3.2; II. Phenomenology of Protective Paternalism in the GDPR and ePD;26
3.2.1; 1. Invasive Paternalism;26
3.2.1.1; a) Prohibition Principle and Need for Formality;26
3.2.1.2; b) “Freely Given” Consent and the Necessity Requirement;28
3.2.1.3; c) Processing of Sensitive Personal Data and “Profiling”;30
3.2.2; 2. Libertarian Paternalism;32
3.2.2.1; a) Privacy by Default;33
3.2.2.2; b) Providing Information;34
3.3; III. Data Paternalism as a Fundamental Rights Problem;36
3.3.1; 1. A Specific Fundamental Right Against Data Paternalism?;39
3.3.1.1; a) Right to Disclose Personal Data;39
3.3.1.2; b) Right to Assess the Disclosure of Personal Data;39
3.3.1.3; d) Conclusion;45
3.3.2; 2. Data Paternalism as Interference with Fundamental Rights;46
3.3.2.1; a) Invasive Paternalism;47
3.3.2.1.1; aa) Formal Consent Requirements;47
3.3.2.1.2; bb) Necessity Requirement;48
3.3.2.2; b) Libertarian Paternalism;48
3.3.2.2.1; aa) Privacy by Default;48
3.3.2.2.2; bb) Providing Information;49
3.4; IV. Justifying Data Paternalism;51
3.4.1; 1. Specific Reasons for Data Paternalism;51
3.4.1.1; a) General Systematic Deficits of Human Decision Making?;51
3.4.1.2; b) Specific and Severe Threats to Personal Autonomy;54
3.4.2; 2. Illuminating the Objective of Data Protection;55
3.4.3; 3. Balancing Personal Autonomy and Data Protection;58
3.4.3.1; a) Citizen-State-Relations;58
3.4.3.2; b) Citizen-Citizen-Relations;59
3.5; V. Conclusion;62
4; Educational Governmental Paternalism: “Buying Social Responsibility”;65
4.1; I. What is Educational Governmental Paternalism?;68
4.1.1; 1. Educational Governmental Paternalism;68
4.1.2; 2. “Buying Social” as an Example of Educational Paternalism;72
4.2; II. Phenomenology of Educational Paternalism in the PPD;74
4.2.1; 1. Strict “Must-Have” Requirements;75
4.2.1.1; a) Social Irresponsibility as a Ground for Exclusion;75
4.2.1.2; b) Social Contract Performance Conditions;76
4.2.1.3; c) Social Requirements in Technical Specifications;78
4.2.2; 2. Softer “Nice-to-Have” Requirements;79
4.2.3; 3. General Limitations of Social Requirements under the PPD;80
4.3; III. “Buying Social” – A Specific Fundamental Rights Problem?;81
4.3.1; 1. Limiting the Tenderer’s Freedom of Occupation;81
4.3.2; 2. Specific Protection Against “Expressive” Content of Law?;84
4.3.3; 3. Protection Against Indirect Effects of “Expressive” Law?;87
4.3.4; 4. Education as Justification for Interferences?;88
4.3.5; 5. Two Specific Constitutional Requirements;93
4.3.5.1; a) Relevance of a Broad-Based Consensus;94
4.3.5.2; b) Consistency Principle;95
4.4; IV. Testing the Concept of “Buying Social”;96
4.4.1; 1. More and Less Morality;96
4.4.2; 2. Requirement of a Broad-Based Consensus;97
4.4.3; 3. Consistency of “Buying Social”;99
4.5; V. Conclusion;102
5; Epilogue: The Future of Governmental Paternalism;105