The Science of Reason

1. Auflage 2010
ISBN: 978-1-84872-015-2
Verlag: Psychology Press

Buch, Englisch, 472 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 1030 g

Reihe: Psychology Press Festschrift Series

This volume is a state-of-the-art survey of the psychology of reasoning, based around, and in tribute to, one of the field’s most eminent figures: Jonathan St B.T. Evans.

In this collection of cutting edge research, Evans’ collaborators and colleagues review a wide range of important and developing areas of inquiry. These include biases in thinking, probabilistic and causal reasoning, people’s use of ‘if’ sentences in arguments, the dual-process theory of thought, and the nature of human rationality. These foundational issues are examined from various angles and finally integrated in a concluding panoramic chapter written by Evans himself.

The eighteen chapters, all written by leading international researchers, combine state-of the-art research with investigation into the most fundamental questions surrounding human mental life, such as:

- What is the architecture of the human mind?

- Are humans rational, and what is the nature of this rationality?

- How do we think hypothetically?

The Science of Reason offers a unique combination of breadth, depth and integrative vision, making it an indispensable resource for researchers and students of human reason.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Manktelow, Ken

Over, David

Elqayam, Shira

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Kognitionspsychologie Intelligenz, Denken, Problemlösen

Inhaltsverzeichnis

K. Manktelow, D. Over, S. Elqayam, Paradigms Shift: Jonathan Evans and the Science of Reason. Part 1. Thinking and Reasoning: Psychological Approaches. G. Politzer, Using Syllogisms in Everyday Life. V. Girotto, M. Gonzalez, Probabilistic Intuitions. D. Green, Arguments in Mind. R. Griggs, C. Koenig, Facilitation and Analogical Transfer on a Hypothetico-Deductive Reasoning Task. Part2. If. K. Oberauer, S. Geiger, K. Fischer, Conditionals and Disjunctions. P. Johnson-Laird, The Truth About Conditionals. N. Pfeifer, G. Kleiter, Uncertain Deductive Reasoning. S. Handley, S. Newstead, H. Neilens, Thinking Before you Decide on the Selection Task: Matching Bias Requires Analytical Reasoning. P. Barrouillet, C. Gauffroy, Dual Processes in the Development of the Understanding of Conditionals. Part 3. Dual Processes and Beyond. P. Legrenzi, Dual Process Theories of Thinking. A. Feeney, A. Crisp, A Conjunction of Fallacies: What Different Types of Causal Conjunction Error Reveal About Dual Processes for Thinking. K. Frankish, M. Kashmirli, Saying One Thing and Meaning Another: A Dual Process Approach to Conversational Implicature. L. Ball, The Dynamics of Reasoning: Chronometric Analysis and Dual-Process Theories. V. Thompson, S. Newstead, N. Morley, Methodological and Theoretical Issues in Belief-Bias: Implications for Dual Process Theories. M. Oaksford, N. Chater, Dual Systems and Dual Processes but a Single Function. Part 4. Rationality and Reasoning. K. Stanovich, R.F.West, M.E.Toplak, Individual Differences as Essential Components of Heuristics and Biases Research. S. Elqayam, Grounded Rationality: A Relativist Framework for Normative Rationality. Part 5. Perspectives on Thinking and Reasoning. J. St. B.T Evans, The Psychology of Reasoning: Reflections on Four Decades of Research.

Über Autor(innen)

Ken Manktelow is Professor of Psychology at the University of Wolverhampton. He was an undergraduate at Plymouth when Jonathan Evans joined the Psychology department, and became Evans’ first research student. Part of his PhD was published in a paper with Evans in 1979. His main interests are in the psychology of deontic reasoning and rationality, and his work is reported in several books (two with David Over) and research papers.
David Over is a Professor of Psychology at Durham University. He has collaborated with Jonathan Evans, publishing numerous articles and two books with him, on dual process theory and the new, probabilistic paradigm in the psychology of reasoning.
Shira Elqayam is a senior lecturer in psychology at De Montfort University. She was a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Plymouth where Jonathan Evans was her supervisor. Since then she has collaborated with Evans on several topics, as well as with David Over. Her main interests are in the psychology of disjunctive reasoning, meta-deduction, and rationality.