Nerlove / Razin / Sadka Household and Economy

Welfare Economics of Endogenous Fertility
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-7468-3
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 174 Seiten, Web PDF

Household and Economy: Welfare Economics of Endogenous Fertility deals with welfare economics and the socially optimal population size, as well as the social consequences of individual choice with respect to family size within each generation. The general equilibrium implications of endogenous fertility for a number of issues of population policy are discussed. In addition to their own consumption, the number of children and the utility of each child is assumed to enter the utility function of the parents. Comprised of 10 chapters, this volume begins with a review of social welfare criteria for optimal population size and the static theory of optimal population size, optimal population growth with exogenous fertility, and the theory of endogenous fertility. The reader is then introduced to the basic principles of welfare economics and the economics of externalities, followed by a summary of the traditional theory of household behavior. Subsequent chapters focus on optimal population size according to various social welfare criteria; real and potential externalities generated by the endogeneity of fertility; and the principal alternative reason for having children: to transfer resources from the present to support the future consumption of parents in old age. The book concludes by assessing the implications of endogenous fertility for within-generation income distribution policies and reflecting on the directions in which future research may be fruitful. This monograph will be of value to economists, social scientists, students of welfare economics, and those who wish to understand the contribution of economic analysis to an improved understanding of population policy.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Nerlove, Marc

Razin, Assaf

Sadka, Efraim

Shell, Karl

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Household and Economy: Welfare Economics of Endogenous Fertility;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;8
5;Dedication;6
6;Preface;12
7;CHAPTER 1. Introduction;16
7.1;1. Social Welfare Criteria;18
7.2;2. Optimal Population Growth with Exogenous Fertility;22
7.3;3. Endogenous Fertility: "The New Home Economics";24
7.4;4. Where We Are Going;28
7.5;Notes;30
7.6;References;30
8;CHAPTER 2. Review of Welfare Economics;34
8.1;1. Feasibility and Efficiency;34
8.2;2. Competitive Equilibria;39
8.3;3. The Relationship Between Pareto Efficiency and Competitive Equilibria;41
8.4;4. Marginal Conditions for Pareto Efficiency and Competitive Equilibrium;44
8.5;5. The Social Welfare Function;45
8.6;6. Second-Best Redistributive Policies;47
8.7;Notes;49
8.8;References;50
9;CHAPTER 3. Economics of Externalities;52
9.1;1. Introduction;52
9.2;2. Pigouvian Corrective Pricing for Externalities in Consumption;54
9.3;3. Public Goods;57
9.4;Notes;58
9.5;References;58
10;CHAPTER 4. The Traditional Theory of Household Behavior;60
10.1;1. Utility Maximization, the Marshallian Demand Function and the Indirect Utility Function;60
10.2;2. Some Properties of the Indirect Utility Function;61
10.3;3. Hicks-Compensated Demand Functions and the Expenditure Function;62
10.4;4. Some Properties of the Expenditure Function;62
10.5;5. The Relationship between the Hicks-Compensated and the Marshallian Demand Functions;63
10.6;Appendix: The Envelope Theorem;66
10.7;Notes;66
10.8;References;66
11;CHAPTER 5. Household Behavior with Endogenous Fertility;68
11.1;1. A Generalized Model of Consumer Choice;68
11.2;2. The Effect of Income on Fertility;70
11.3;3. Conclusion;73
11.4;Notes;73
11.5;References;73
12;CHAPTER 6. Socially Optimal Population Size;74
12.1;1. Criteria for Social Optima with Variable Population;74
12.2;2. Individual Choice and Social Optima;78
12.3;3. Optimal Population Policies;87
12.4;4. An Infinite Horizon Model;92
12.5;5. Conclusion;93
12.6;Notes;93
12.7;References;94
13;CHAPTER 7. Potential Market Failures;96
13.1;1. Public Goods and Malthusian Fixed Land;97
13.2;2. Efficiency with Infinite Overlapping Generations;102
13.3;Appendix;108
13.4;Notes;112
13.5;References;112
14;CHAPTER 8. Real Market Failures;114
14.1;1. Bequest as a Public Good within Marriage;115
14.2;2. Investment in Human and Physical Capital and Transfers among Siblings;120
14.3;Appendix;131
14.4;Notes;132
14.5;References;133
15;CHAPTER 9. Children as a Capital Good;134
15.1;1. A Simple Model of the Old Age Security Hypothesis;135
15.2;2. The Old Age Security Hypothesis Reconsidered: A Microeconomic Analysis;138
15.3;3. The Old Age Security Hypothesis Reconsidered: A General Equilibrium Example;140
15.4;References;143
16;CHAPTER 10. Intragenerational Income Distribution Policies;144
16.1;1. Fixed Labor Supply;145
16.2;2. A Model with Variable Labor Supply;150
16.3;Notes;154
16.4;References;154
17;Epilogue;156
17.1;1. Tax and Transfer Policies;157
17.2;2. Public Goods and Dynasty Taxes;158
17.3;3. Intragenerational Income Distribution with Household Production and Endogenous Fertility;159
17.4;4. Heterogeneous Family Preferences;160
17.5;5. Uncertainty with Respect to Child Quality;160
18;Author Index;162
19;Subject Index;166