Buch, Englisch, Band 280, 396 Seiten, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 657 g
Reihe: International Series in Operations Research & Management Science
Essays in Honor of Georges Zaccour
Buch, Englisch, Band 280, 396 Seiten, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 657 g
Reihe: International Series in Operations Research & Management Science
ISBN: 978-3-030-19109-2
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Zielgruppe
Research
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
Chapter 1. A Lanchester-Type Dynamic Game of Advertising and Pricing.- Chapter 2. On the Modelling of Price Effects in the Diffusion of Optional Contingent Products.- Chapter 3. The effects of consumer rebates in a competitive distribution channel.- Chapter 4. On the coordination of static and dynamic marketing channels in a duopoly with advertising.- Chapter 5. Product Recalls and Channel Pricing.- Chapter 6. Coordination in Closed-loop supply chain with price-dependent returns.- Chapter 7. A steady-state game of a net-zero emission climate regime.- Chapter 8. Dynamic Models of the Firm with Green Energy and Goodwill with a Constant Size of the Output Market.- Chapter 9. A Review of Experiments on Dynamic Games in Environmental and Resource Economics.- Chapter 10. Managerial incentives and polluting inputs under imperfect competition.- Chapter 11. Non-linear incentive equilibrium strategies for a transboundary pollution differential game.- Chapter 12. Strategic interaction among firms in output and emission markets: a unified framework.- Chapter 13. Human vs River: Cooperation in Environmental Games through Environmental Personhood.- Chapter 14. A dynamic game with interaction between Kantian players and Nashian players.- Chapter 15. Frugals, Militants and the Oil Market.- Chapter 16. Compliance with social norms as an evolutionary stable equilibrium.- Chapter 17. Building E cient Institutions: A Two-Stage Differential Game.- Chapter 18. Game theory and cyber defence.- Chapter 19. A LQ vaccine communication game.- Chapter 20. On the Stability of a Two-Player International Environmental Agreement with Intra-Industry Trade.- Chapter 21. Stable coalition structures in dynamic competitive environment.