Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution

1974. Auflage 1974
ISBN: 978-90-277-0424-5
Verlag: Springer

Buch, Englisch, Band 2, 285 Seiten, Format (B × H): 162 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 541 g

Reihe: Theory and Decision Library

Game theory could be formally defined as a theory of rational decision in conflict situations. Models of such situations, as they are conceived in game theory, involve (1) a set of decision makers, called players; (2) a set of strategies available to each player; (3) a set of outcomes, each of which is a result of particular choices of strategies made by the players on a given play of the game; and (4) a set of payoffs accorded to each player in each of the possible outcomes. It is assumed that each player is 'individually rational', in the sense that his preference ordering of the outcomes is determined by the order of magnitudes of his (and only his) associated payoffs. Further, a player is rational in the sense that he assumes that every other player is rational in the above sense. The rational player utilizes knowledge of the other players' payoffs in guiding his choice of strategy, because it gives him information about how the other players' choices are guided. Since, in general, the orders of magnitude of the payoffs that accrue to the several players in the several outcomes do not coincide, a game of strategy is a model of a situation involving conflicts of interests.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Rapoport, Anatol

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Soziologie | Soziale Arbeit Soziologie Allgemein Empirische Sozialforschung, Statistik
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Ökonometrie
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Operations Research Spieltheorie
• Sozialwissenschaften Soziologie | Soziale Arbeit Soziologie Allgemein Demographie, Demoskopie
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Wirtschaftsmathematik und -statistik

Inhaltsverzeichnis

I. Two-Person Games.- Prisoner’s Dilemma — Recollections and Observations.- Structural Properties and Resolutions of the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game.- On 2×2 Games and Braithwaite’s Arbitration Scheme.- Design and Conduct of Metagame Theoretic Experiments.- Testing Nash’s Solution of the Cooperative Game.- II. N-Person Games.- Test of the Bargaining Set and Kernel Models in Three-person Games.- Test of the Kernel and Two Bargaining Set Models in Four- and Five-person Games.- A Shapley Value for Cooperative Games with Quarrelling.- Coalitions and Payoffs in Three-person Supergames under Multiple-trial Agreements.- The Application of Compromise Solutions to Reporting Games.- ‘General’ Metagames: An Extension of the Metagame Concept.