Market Design Powers of the European Commission?

Remedies under Articles 7 and 9 Regulation 1/03
1. Auflage 2020
ISBN: 978-3-662-60713-8
Verlag: Springer

Buch, Englisch, Band 13, 563 Seiten, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 873 g

Reihe: Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the remedies practice the European Commission has adopted on the basis of articles 7 and 9 of regulation 1/03. Using article 7 as a normative benchmark, it shows that most of the criticism levelled at the Commission's article 9 decisions and the Alrosa judgment of the CJEU is not justified, since critics tend to over-state both the rigour of article 7 and the laxness of article 9. Remaining inconsistencies between the commitment practice and the standards for infringement decisions can, it is submitted, be justified by the consensual nature of commitment decisions and their underlying goal of procedural economy. Moreover, it is suggested that too little importance is generally assigned to the beneficial effect which commitments bring about by providing for precise and enforceable obligations without sacrificing the concerned undertakings’ freedom to choose how to put the infringement to an end. Adopting a case-oriented approach, this studyprovides valuable insights for academics and practitioners alike.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Reiter, Korbinian

Fachgebiete

• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Wirtschaftspolitik, politische Ökonomie
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Internationale Beziehungen Europäische Union, Europapolitik
• Rechtswissenschaften Internationales Recht und Europarecht Europarecht Europäisches Handels-, Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsrecht, Währungsrecht

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction.- Prolegomena.- The relaxation of the link between harm and remedy.- The relaxation of procedural safeguards.- The impact of commitments on legal certainty.- Outlook: Discussions of reform proposals.- Summary of key findings.

Über Autor(innen)

Korbinian Reiter is a lawyer in Berlin and former researcher at the Max-Planck-Institute for Innovation and Competition as well as a former legal secretary at the General Court and at the Court of Justice of the European Union.