Seedhouse The New Space Race: China vs. USA

1. Auflage 2010
ISBN: 978-1-4419-0880-3
Verlag: Praxis
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 256 Seiten

Reihe: Springer Praxis Books

The world's most populous nation views space as an asset, not only from a technological and commercial perspective but also from a political one. The repercussions of this ideology already extend far beyond Washington. China vs. the United States explores future Chinese aspirations in space and the implications of a looming space race.Dr. Seedhouse provides background information on the fifteen-year history of the China National Space Administration and its long list of accomplishments. Sino-U.S. technological and commercial interests in space are discussed, including their interest in encouraging a potential space race. The national security objectives of the U.S. and China are also examined.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Seedhouse, Erik

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Table of contents
;5
2;Preface
;10
3;Acknowledgments
;13
4;About the author
;14
5;Figures
;16
6;Tables
;19
7;Panels
;21
8;Abbreviations
;22
9;Section I High Frontier Politics;27
9.1;1.Rising dragon
;28
9.1.1;THE WHY AND HOW OF CHINA'S LONG MARCH INTO SPACE
;28
9.1.2;THE WHY
;28
9.1.2.1;China's motivation
;30
9.1.2.1.1;Redressing the balance
;30
9.1.2.1.2;International prestige
;32
9.1.2.1.3;Nationalism
;32
9.1.2.1.4;Economy
;33
9.1.2.1.5;Scientific and technological advancement
;34
9.1.2.1.6;Prolitical progression
;34
9.1.2.1.7;International relations
;35
9.1.2.1.8;Social and cultural
;35
9.1.2.1.9;The strategic high ground
;36
9.1.2.2;The real why of China's spaceflight program
;37
9.1.3;THE HOW
;37
9.1.3.1;The Mao Zedong era
;37
9.1.3.2;Tsien Hsue-shen: the father of China's space program
;38
9.1.3.3;The route to China's first manned space program
;38
9.1.3.3.1;Dongfanghong-1
;40
9.1.3.3.2;Deng Xiaoping's e
ra ;40
9.1.3.3.3;Developing the Long March launch vehicle
;40
9.1.3.3.4;Setbacks
;40
9.1.3.3.5;Project 921
;41
9.1.3.3.6;Project 921 hardware acwuisition
;42
9.1.3.3.7;Debut of the Shenzhou capsule
;42
9.1.3.3.8;Astronaut training
;42
9.1.3.3.9;Unmanned missions
;44
9.1.3.3.10;Manned missions
;45
9.1.4;SUMMARY
;46
9.1.5;REFERENCES
;47
9.2;2 US and Chinese space policy
;48
9.2.1;THE CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SPACE ACTIVITIES IN THE PURSUIT OF HIGH AMBITION
;48
9.2.2;US SPACE POLICY
;48
9.2.2.1;Principles of US space policy
;48
9.2.2.2;Polycy goals and guidelines
;51
9.2.2.2.1;The role of science and engineering
;51
9.2.2.2.2;The problems of ITAR
;53
9.2.2.3;National security space guidelines;55
9.2.2.3.1;Achieving national defense policy objectives
;55
9.2.2.4;Civil space policy
;56
9.2.2.5;Commercial space guidelines
;57
9.2.2.6;International space cooperation
;60
9.2.2.7;Space nuclear power
;60
9.2.2.8;Radio frequency spectrum and orbit management and interference protection
;60
9.2.2.9;Orbital debris
;61
9.2.2.10;Analysis of US space policy
;62
9.2.3;CHINESE SPACE POLICY
;64
9.2.3.1;Overview of China's space policy
;65
9.2.3.2;Forces influencing China's space policy
;65
9.2.3.3;China's strategy
;66
9.2.3.3.1;Five-Year plans
;66
9.2.3.3.2;White Papers
;67
9.2.3.3.3;Manned spaceflght
;70
9.2.3.3.4;Science and technology
;70
9.2.3.3.5;Satellite export
;71
9.2.3.3.6;Cooperation
;71
9.2.3.3.7;Economic effects
;72
9.2.3.4;China's space policy analyzed
;72
9.2.3.5;US and China's space strategies
;72
9.2.4;REFERENCES ;73
10;Section II Dark Arena;74
10.1;3 Space warfare doctrine
;76
10.1.1;FOUR SCHOOLS OF SPACE DOCTRINE
;77
10.1.1.1;Sanctuary school
;78
10.1.1.2;Survivability school
;79
10.1.1.3;Domination;80
10.1.1.4;Control
;81
10.1.2;ENFORCING A SPACE POWER DOCTRINE
;81
10.1.2.1;Logistical structure
;81
10.1.2.2;Manned capability
;82
10.1.2.3;Space surveillance system
;82
10.1.2.4;Space weapons
;82
10.1.2.5;Organizational
;82
10.1.3;SPACE WARFARE;84
10.1.3.1;Elements of space warfare
;84
10.1.3.1.1;Space force support
;84
10.1.3.1.2;Space force enhancement
;87
10.1.3.1.3;Space control
;89
10.1.3.1.4;Space force application
;90
10.1.4;US SPACE WARFARE DOCTRINE
;90
10.1.4.1;US objectives in space warfare
;90
10.1.4.1.1;Politics of space superiority
;91
10.1.4.2;The right to act
;92
10.1.4.3;Protecting space assets
;92
10.1.4.4;Avoiding arms control limitations
;93
10.1.4.5;Other limitations
;94
10.1.4.6;Obama's space defense plans
;95
10.1.5;CHINA'S SPACE WARFARE DOCTRINE
;96
10.1.5.1;Code red? China's anti-satellite test
;97
10.1.5.2;China's counterspace doctrine
;98
10.1.5.2.1;Asymmetric advantage;99
10.1.5.2.2;Defending the high ground
;100
10.1.5.3;Deciphering intent;100
10.1.6;REFERENCES
;101
10.2;4 Military space assets
;103
10.2.1;SINO-US MILITARY SPACE CAPABILITIES
;103
10.2.1.1;The first space war
;104
10.2.1.2;What constitutes a space weapon?
;105
10.2.1.2.1;Definition of a "space weapon"
;105
10.2.1.3;Space weapon-enabling technologies
;107
10.2.1.4;The battlefield in space
;107
10.2.2;OVERVIEW OF SINO-US MILITARY SPACE CAPABILITIES
;108
10.2.2.1;United States
;108
10.2.2.2;China
;110
10.2.3;CURRENT AND FUTURE CHINESE AND US SPACE WEAPONS;111
10.2.3.1;Space transportation
;111
10.2.3.1.1;Us launch vehicle
;111
10.2.3.1.2;China's launch vehicles
;116
10.2.3.2;Satellite operations/Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)
;116
10.2.3.3;Command, control and communications (C3)
;118
10.2.3.4;Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
;119
10.2.3.5;Environmental monitoring
;120
10.2.3.6;Space control and force application
;120
10.2.3.6.1;Microsatellites
;120
10.2.3.6.1.1;FALCON ;120
10.2.3.6.2;Parasitic satellites
;121
10.2.3.6.3;Kinetic-energy weapons
;121
10.2.3.6.4;Kinetic-energy anti-satellites
;122
10.2.3.6.5;Ballistic missile defense system
;122
10.2.3.6.6;Non-directional attacks;124
10.2.3.6.7;The Blackout Bomb
;124
10.2.3.6.8;Directed-energy weapons
;127
10.2.3.6.9;Assassin's Mace
;128
10.2.3.7;Consequences of US and Chinese space weapons
;128
10.2.3.7.1;The case for China
;129
10.2.3.7.2;The case for the US
;129
10.2.3.8;Arms race inevitability
;130
10.2.4;REFERENCES
;130
10.3;5 Exploding China's dreams
;131
10.3.1;HOW THE US WILL MAINTAIN SPACE DOMINANCE
;131
10.3.1.1;Pursuit of US space dominance
;132
10.3.1.2;The Air Force Space Command Strategic Master Plan;132
10.3.1.2.1;Shaping the space environment;133
10.3.1.3;Us asymmetric advatage and vulnerability
;134
10.3.1.4;Chinese counterspace reaction
;135
10.3.1.5;Counterspace consequences
;136
10.3.1.5.1;Consequence of counter-counterspace operations
;137
10.3.2;WINNING AND LOSING A WAR IN SPACE
;138
10.3.2.1;How China would lose a war in space
;138
10.3.2.1.1;First strike
;138
10.3.2.1.2;Geostationary satellites
;140
10.3.2.1.3;Pre-emption
;140
10.3.2.1.4;Consequences
;141
10.3.2.2;How China would win a war in space
;141
10.3.2.2.1;Pre-emption
;141
10.3.2.2.2;Reactive satellite maneuver
;143
10.3.2.2.3;The weakness of GPS
;143
10.3.2.3;Cold reality of space
;143
10.3.2.4;Commanding the futere
;144
10.3.2.5;Onerous responsibility
;146
10.3.3;REFERENCES
;147
11;Section III The Second Space Race
;148
11.1;6 Chinese and American space exploration programs
;153
11.1.1;THE VISION FOR SPACE EXPLORATION
;153
11.1.1.1;Constellation overview
;154
11.1.1.1.1;Hardware
;154
11.1.1.1.2;Realizing the VSE: commissioning the Exploration Systems Architecture Study
;155
11.1.2;EXPLORATION SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE STUDY CHARTER
;156
11.1.2.1;Exploration Systems Architecture Study Ground Rules and Assumptions
;156
11.1.2.2;Exploration Systems Architecture Study tasks
;157
11.1.2.3;Mission architecture overview;157
11.1.2.4;Design Reference Missions overvew
;158
11.1.2.5;DRM: transportation of astronauts to and from the ISS
;158
11.1.2.6;DRM: transportation of unpressutized cargo to the ISS
;158
11.1.2.7;DRM: Transportation of pressurized cargo to and from the ISS
;158
11.1.2.8;DRM: manned lunar mission with cargo
;158
11.1.2.9;DRM: cargo transportation to lunar surface
;159
11.1.2.10;DRM: outpost mission with crew and cargo
;159
11.1.3;THE CONSTELLATION PROGRAM
;160
11.1.3.1;Rationale for returning to the Moon
;161
11.1.3.1.1;Science
;161
11.1.3.1.2;Technology
;162
11.1.3.1.3;Exploration and exploitation
;162
11.1.3.2;US motivations for realizing the vision
;162
11.1.3.2.1;The columbia effect
;162
11.1.3.2.2;The Chinese motive
;163
11.1.3.3;Financial obstacles
;163
11.1.3.3.1;The true cost of Orion and Ares
;163
11.1.3.3.2;Reducing costs
;164
11.1.3.3.3;Ares I schedule pressures
;164
11.1.3.3.4;Orion/Are I schedule pressures
;164
11.1.3.3.5;Test facilities
;165
11.1.3.3.6;Technology and hardwar gaps
;165
11.1.3.4;NASA's challenging transition
;166
11.1.4;CHINA'S MANNED SPACEFLIGHT PROGRAM
;167
11.1.4.1;Manned spaceflight philosophy
;167
11.1.4.2;Review of China's manned space program
;168
11.1.4.3;Future Five-Year Plans
;168
11.1.4.3.1;Manned lunar mission
;168
11.1.4.3.2;Lunar precursor missions
;169
11.1.4.3.3;Tiangong mission sequence
;169
11.1.4.3.4;Mission timelines
;170
11.1.4.3.5;Long March-5
;170
11.1.4.4;China's lunar program
;170
11.1.4.5;National rivalries
;173
11.1.5;REFERENCES
;173
11.2;7 Current and future hardware
;174
11.2.1;NASA'S HARDWARE
;174
11.2.1.1;Constellation hardware
;175
11.2.1.1.1;Ares I and Ares V
;175
11.2.1.1.2;AresI;175
11.2.1.1.3;Ares I nominal mission profile
;176
11.2.1.1.4;Ares test flights
;177
11.2.1.1.5;Ares I and V propulsion
;178
11.2.1.1.6;Ares V
;179
11.2.1.1.7;Ares V concept of operations
;179
11.2.1.1.8;Ares V elements
;179
11.2.1.2;Altair
;181
11.2.1.3;Altair concept of operations
;181
11.2.1.4;Orion
;183
11.2.1.4.1;Orion systems and subsystems
;183
11.2.1.4.1.1;Vehicle communication
;186
11.2.1.4.1.2;Orion's avionics
;186
11.2.1.4.1.3;Environmental control and life support system
;186
11.2.1.4.1.4;Active thermal control system
;187
11.2.1.4.1.5;Parachute and landing system
;187
11.2.1.4.2;Service module
;187
11.2.1.4.3;Spacecraft adapter
;189
11.2.1.4.4;Launch Abort System
;189
11.2.1.4.5;Orion abort modes
;189
11.2.1.4.6;Space suit systems
;189
11.2.2;CHINESE HARDWARE
;191
11.2.2.1;Long March launch vehicles
;191
11.2.2.1.1;Long March-2F
;191
11.2.2.1.2;Design
;192
11.2.2.1.3;Long March 2F|H
;192
11.2.2.1.4;Long March-5
;194
11.2.2.1.5;Long March-5 design
;194
11.2.2.1.6;Vehicle configuration
;195
11.2.2.2;Shenzhou spacecraft
;195
11.2.2.2.1;Shenzhou modules
;196
11.2.2.2.2;Orbital module
;197
11.2.2.2.3;Re-entry module
;197
11.2.2.2.4;Service module
;199
11.2.2.3;Space suit systems
;201
11.2.2.3.1;Orlan space suit
;201
11.2.2.4;An assessment of China's current space technology capabilities
;202
11.3;8 Manned spaceflight experience
;203
11.3.1;CHINA'S MANNED SPACEFLIGHT EXPERTISE
;204
11.3.1.1;Taikonauts and Yuhangyuans
;204
11.3.1.2;Chronology of China's manned spaceflights
;204
11.3.1.2.1;Shen
zhou 5 ;204
11.3.1.2.2;Shenzhou 5 crew
;206
11.3.1.2.3;Shenzhou 5 flight
;207
11.3.1.2.4;Political outcome
;207
11.3.1.2.5;Shenzhou 6
;208
11.3.1.2.6;Shenzhou 6 Crew
;209
11.3.1.2.7;Shenzhou 6 Flight
;209
11.3.1.2.8;Political outcome
;210
11.3.1.2.9;Shenzhou 7
;211
11.3.1.2.10;Shenzhou 7 crew
;211
11.3.1.2.11;Flight
;212
11.3.2;US MANNED SPACEFLIGHT EXPERTISE
;214
11.3.2.1;A brief history of notable spaceflights
;214
11.3.2.1.1;Project Mercury
;214
11.3.2.1.2;Project Gemini
;215
11.3.2.1.3;Apollo Program
;215
11.3.2.1.4;Skylab
;216
11.3.2.1.5;Apollo-Soyuz Test Project
;216
11.3.2.1.6;Space Shuttle Program
;217
11.3.2.1.7;Highlights of the Space Shuttle Program
;218
11.3.2.1.8;International Space Station 10th anniversary
;222
11.3.2.2;Anatomy of a Space Shuttle mission: STS-116
;222
11.3.2.3;Future of American manned spaceflight
;224
12;Section IV Why Cooperation Won't Work and Why a New Space Race is Looming;227
12.1;9 The case for and against collaboration with China
;228
12.1.1;CHINA'S COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS
;229
12.1.2;DANGERS OF COLLABORATION
;230
12.1.2.1;China's ASAT test
;230
12.1.2.2;The prohibitive cost of collaboration
;231
12.1.2.3;Diplomacy in orbit has no effect on Earth
;231
12.1.2.4;Technology transfer
;232
12.1.3;BARRIERS TO COLLABORATION
;232
12.1.3.1;Moral compromise
;232
12.1.3.2;Lack of transparency
;233
12.1.4;ALTERNATIVE FUTURES: COOPERATING WITH CHINA
;234
12.1.4.1;Unpredicted outcomes
;234
12.1.4.2;Avoiding a descent into space warfare
;234
12.1.4.3;Space cooperation mechanisms
;235
12.1.5;COLLABORATION REALITY
;236
12.1.5.1;Sidelining China
;236
12.1.5.2;US dominance in space
;236
12.1.6;REFERENCES
;237
12.2;10 The imminent space race
;238
12.2.1;THE NEW MANNED SPACE RACE
;238
12.2.1.1;How China's manned space program may fuel a new race
;239
12.2.1.1.1;Acquiring soft power
;239
12.2.1.1.2;Maintaining leadership in space
;239
12.2.1.1.3;Predicting the future
;240
12.2.1.1.4;China's near-future manned spaceflight activities
;240
12.2.1.1.5;Planning for the new space race
;241
12.2.1.2;Space race inevitability
;241
12.2.2;THE NEW ARMS RACE IN SPACE
;242
12.2.2.1;China's military space plans
;242
12.2.2.1.1;The soft kill doctrine
;242
12.2.2.1.2;Schriever I and the Taiwan issue
;243
12.2.2.2;China's threat to the US
;244
12.2.2.3;The case against an arms race in space
;245
12.2.2.4;The case for an arms race in space
;245
12.2.2.5;Financing the new race in space
;247
12.2.2.6;Consequences of an arms race in space
;248
12.2.2.7;Dawn of the new space race
;248
12.2.3;REFERENCES
;249
13;Appendix I;250
13.1;ORBITS
;250
13.1.1;Geostationary orbits
;250
13.1.2;Polar orbits
;250
13.1.3;Sun synchronous orbits
;251
13.1.4;Inclined orbits
;251
14;Appendix II
;252
14.1;OUTER SPACE TREATY
;252
14.1.1;Article I
;252
14.1.2;Article II
;253
14.1.3;Article III
;253
14.1.4;Article IV;253
14.1.5;Article V
;253
14.1.6;Article VI
;253
15;Appendix III
;257
15.1;SPACE WEAPON TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRAMS
;257
15.1.1;Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
;257
15.1.2;Common Aero Vehicle/Hypersonic Technology Vehicle
;257
15.1.3;Defence Support Program
;258
15.1.4;Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology space vehicle
;258
15.1.5;Escort satellites
;258
15.1.6;Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
;258
15.1.7;Experimental Spacecraft System-11 (XSS-11
);259
15.1.8;Force Application and Launch from Continental United States (FALCON)
;259
15.1.9;Ground-based Midcourse Defense system
;259
15.1.10;Kinetic Enegry Interceptor
;260
15.1.11;Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile Program
;260
15.1.12;Miniature Kill Vehicle
;260
15.1.13;Multiple Kill Vehicle Payload System
;261
15.1.14;Nanosatellites/Miniature Spacecraft
;261
15.1.15;Near Field Infrared Experiment
;261
15.1.16;Operationally Responsive Spacelift
;261
15.1.17;Orbital Boost Vehicle
;262
15.1.18;Sea-based Midcourse Defense system
;262
15.1.19;Small Launch Vehicle;262
15.1.20;Space-Based Infrared System;262
15.1.21;Space-Based Surveillance System
;263
15.1.22;Space Tracking and Surveillance System
;263
15.1.23;Standard Missile-3
;263
16;Index
;265