E-Book, Englisch, Band 4, 461 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 227 mm
Siefert Social Security in India and China
1. Auflage 2015
ISBN: 978-3-8452-7019-7
Verlag: Nomos
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Reforms, Development and Determinants of Social Security Provision in India and China (2004-2009)
E-Book, Englisch, Band 4, 461 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 227 mm
ISBN: 978-3-8452-7019-7
Verlag: Nomos
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
The main goal of the comparative study is to analyse contemporary social security provision and its determinants in India and China. Contrary to the classical assumption of Western liberal theoretical reasoning and empirical inquiries, China seems to be doing much better than India in terms of social security provisions. Thus, it is argued that institutional causality or regime effect is less relevant for the policy performance. Moreover, the study attempts to solve the puzzle of the missing comparative democratic advantage by answering the core research question: Why is the People’s Republic of China outperforming the Indian Democratic Republic in providing social security? In pursuing the leading core question the study aims at an empirical and theoretical investigation of political institutions and their relevance for the development of social security provision in both countries.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Regierungspolitik Innen-, Bildungs- und Bevölkerungspolitik
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Regierungspolitik Sozialpolitik
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Studien zu einzelnen Ländern und Gebieten
- Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Cover;1
2; I. Introduction – Social Security Provision in India and China;22
2.1; 1.1 The Puzzle;24
2.2; 1.2 Research Questions and general Assumption of the Study;26
2.3; 1.3 Methodolgical Approach;28
2.4; 1.4 Aim of the Study;30
2.5; 1.5 Academic Relevance;30
2.6; 1.6 Review on the Public Policy Literature;37
2.6.1; Limitations of the existing public policy literature for India and China;40
2.7; 1.7 Design of the Study;43
3; II. Method;45
3.1; 2.1 A Most Different Case Design;45
3.1.1; 2.1.1 Oranges and Apples: Can Democracies be compared to non-Democracies?;46
3.1.2; 2.1.2 Exploring the Puzzle: Social Security Provisions and Regime Type;49
3.1.3; 2.1.3 Social Security and ‘Good’ Governance;51
3.1.4; 2.1.4 Can Asia be compared to Europe?;53
3.1.5; 2.1.5 China and India: Same Path, different Goals?;55
3.1.5.1; The Chinese case: illustrating the requirement of adaptation;56
3.2; 2.2 Towards a comparable Definition of Social Security;57
3.2.1; 2.2.1 In Pursuit of a Working Definition;60
3.2.2; 2.2.2 India and Chinese Concept of Social Security: Same Word, different Meaning;62
3.2.3; 2.2.3 Working Definition for Social Security;63
3.3; 2.3 Welfare Literature and the two Cases;64
3.3.1; 2.3.1 Three classical approaches in theoretical reasoning and their implications;65
3.3.2; 2.3.2 Towards an actor-orientated approach;68
3.3.3; 2.3.3 Path-dependency and Social Security Provision;70
3.3.4; 2.3.4 Critical Evalution on the existing Typologies;71
3.3.5; 2.3.5 Expanding the View – Welfare Regimes Types in autocratic Systems;73
3.3.5.1; Typology of Social Political Regimes in non-Democracies;74
3.4; 2.4 Method of Process Tracing and the Analytic Narrative;77
3.4.1; 2.4.1 Narrative, Path-Dependency and Critical Junctures;80
3.4.2; 2.4.2 Narratives of Social Security Policy Development;82
3.5; 2.5 The theoretical Framework and the Working Model;83
3.5.1; 2.5.1 New Institutionalism in Comparative Political Literature;84
3.5.2; 2.5.2 Relevane of Culture and Social Preferences in Literature;85
3.5.2.1; 2.5.2.1 New Institutional Logic of Inquiry;88
3.5.2.2; 2.5.2.2 A Sequence Model of Social Security Provision;93
3.5.2.3; 2.5.2.3 Definition of Institutions: Why they matter?;94
3.5.3; 2.5.3 A New Institutional Model: Politics, Policy and Polity;97
3.5.4; 2.5.4 Comments on the applied theoretical Model;101
4; III. Descriptive View on India and China;102
4.1; 3.1 Descriptive Inquiry and the analytic Narrative;102
4.1.1; 3.1.1 Regional Differences;104
4.1.2; 3.1.2 Social Security Provision: The Gap between Objectives and Outcomes;106
4.1.3; 3.1.3 Female Participation in the Work-force;113
4.1.4; 3.1.4 Vulnerability;115
4.1.5; 3.1.5 Comments on Social Security Provision in China and India;117
4.2; 3.2 Historical Development of Social Security Politics;118
4.2.1; 3.2.1 General reflection on the Path-Dependency of Social Security Provision;118
4.2.2; 3.2.2 Social Security Policy Trajectories;119
4.3; 3.3 Same Goal, different Paths: Evolution of the Chinese case;121
4.3.1; 3.3.1 Following Socialistic Vision, 1949 to 1977;122
4.3.1.1; 3.3.1.1 The Iron Rice Bowl: Left-totalitarian Welfare Regime and its Features;123
4.3.2; 3.3.2 The First Period: Coming crises, hard figures vs. Socialistic Vision, 1978 to 1992;126
4.3.3; 3.3.3 The Second Period: A Conflict of Visions, 1993-2004;130
4.3.3.1; 3.3.3.1 Reform Period and Blueprint for today;131
4.3.3.2; 3.3.3.2 Evolution of a pluralistic System in China;134
4.3.3.3; 3.3.3.3 Introducing market-orientated Social Security Schemes in a pluralistic Setting;135
4.3.3.3.1; RSCs: illustrating the deficits in policymaking and provision;137
4.3.3.3.2; Shequ system – an example for urban focused focus of policy making;139
4.3.4; 3.3.4 The Second Period: Social Security Politics, 1993-2004;141
4.3.4.1; The urban Pension Scheme: Strengths and Deficits;142
4.3.4.2; Voluntary rural Pensions: Planning Challenges and Program Concurrency;144
4.3.4.3; Health Insurance: The Issue of a missing coherent National Strategy;146
4.3.4.4; Unemployment Insurance: Modest Coverage and low Benefits;150
4.3.4.5; Maternity Insurance: Longitude and Commitment of Policy Making;152
4.3.4.6; Employment Injury Insurance: Addressing Unemployment;153
4.3.4.7; MSLS: A pioneering Project and its programmatic and ideological Constraints;154
4.3.4.8; The Urban MSLS: In pursuit of Universal Coverage;156
4.3.4.9; Five Guarantees: Providing minimal Social Assistance;159
4.3.5; 3.3.5 The Third Period: Balanced economic and social Development, 2004 to 2009;161
4.3.6; 3.3.6 Welfare Regime with Chinese Characteristics;163
4.3.7; 3.3.7 Comments on Social Security Provision in China;167
4.4; 3.4 Same Goal, different Paths: Evolution of the Indian case;168
4.4.1; 3.4.1 Following a socialist Vision, 1949-1977;170
4.4.1.1; 3.4.1.1 Continuity and Departure of Social Security Provision in the 1960s;172
4.4.1.1.1; The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923: Relics of Colonial Rule;173
4.4.1.1.2; The Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948;175
4.4.1.1.3; The Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952;176
4.4.1.1.4; The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961;178
4.4.1.1.5; Government and Public Enterprise Schemes;179
4.4.1.1.6; Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972: the Eve of Paradigm Change;180
4.4.2; 3.4.2 The First Period: Blueprint for the modern Welfare Regime, 1978 to 1992;181
4.4.3; 3.4.3 The Second Period: Performance has Priority, 1993 to 2004;186
4.4.3.1; PDS: Policy Trajectories, changed Scope and the BPL Target Group;189
4.4.3.1.1; 3.4.3.1 Social Security Provision in the late 1990s and early 2000s;192
4.4.3.1.2; 3.4.3.2 India’s Social Security and typical Deficits, 1991-2004;193
4.4.3.1.3; 3.4.3.3 Expanding the Safety Net for elderly people;194
4.4.3.1.4; 3.4.3.4 Three Categories: the Range, Ccope and Deficits of typical pension schemes;195
4.4.3.2; The National Pension Scheme;196
4.4.3.3; The Pension Scheme under the National Social Assistance Program;197
4.4.3.4; Indira Gandhi’s National Old Age Pension Scheme;199
4.4.3.5; Varishtha Pension Bima: A ‘fill-in’ for the IGNOPAS;200
4.4.3.6; The Micro Pension Scheme: Empowering Women;201
4.4.3.6.1; 3.4.3.5 Social Security and Health insurance in the unorganised sector;201
4.4.3.7; Janashree Bhima Yojana: The modern Health Care Scheme;202
4.4.3.8; The Universal Health Insurance Scheme;203
4.4.3.9; SEWA Health Insurance - A Non governmental Initiative;205
4.4.3.9.1; 3.4.3.6 Social Security Schemes for the unorganised Sector;206
4.4.3.10; The Janashree Bima Yojana Life Insurance;206
4.4.3.11; The Krishi Samajik Suraksha Yojana – just a policy;207
4.4.4; 3.4.4 The Third Period: Balanced economic and social Development, 2004 to 2009;208
4.4.4.1; 3.4.4.1 The NREGA and Social Assistance in India;209
4.4.4.1.1; The Active Labour Market Programme or the ‘Right to work’;210
4.4.4.2; 3.4.4.2 Initiatives to improve the Social Security of unorganised Workers;212
4.4.4.2.1; Bima Yojana – the flagship scheme and its problems;212
4.4.4.2.2; Aam Admi Bima Yojana;214
4.4.5; 3.4.5 Welfare Regime with Indian Characteristics;215
4.5; 3.5 Comments on the historical descriptive Perspective;219
5; IV. Economical-descriptive Approach;221
5.1; 4.1 Elaboration of Wagner’s Law in times of austerity;223
5.2; 4.2 Economic Growth and institutional Causality;224
5.3; 4.3 Explanatory Power of the demographic Growth;226
5.3.1; 4.3.1 Economic Constraints on Social Security Policy Performance;227
5.3.2; 4.3.2 Budget Restrictions: Debts and Revenues;229
5.3.3; 4.3.3 Budget Restrictions: Programm Concurrency;230
5.4; 4.4 Social Security Provision in Times of Global Economies;231
5.4.1; 4.4.1 Changing Employment Situation, Trade Openness and Social Security;235
5.5; 4.5 Economical, Social and Demographic Factors;236
5.5.1; 4.5.1 Demographic Change and Public Policy;238
5.6; 4.6 Comments on socio-economical Determinants;242
6; V. Social Security Provision, State Capacity and Regime Type;243
6.1; 5.1 In Pursuit of Regime Type: General reflection;243
6.1.1; 5.1.1 Defining Regime Types;244
6.2; 5.2 Assumed institutional Causalities and Social Security;247
6.3; 5.3 Social Expenditure: Assumed Effects and the Reality;251
6.4; 5.4 Remark on the Regime Type and Social Security;253
7; VI. State format and Social Security Provision;255
7.1; 6.1 Institutional Constrains on Policy Making;255
7.1.1; 6.1.2 Autocracies, Democracies in Developing Countries, and institutional Veto Points;257
7.1.2; 6.1.3 MDCD and the Issue of Comparison;258
7.2; 6.2 Descriptive Perspective: Constitutional and institutional Constrains;262
7.2.1; 6.2.1 Institutional veto points in China and India;263
7.3; 6.3 State Format: National Level and Decision Making;265
7.3.1; 6.3.1 India’s resilient Democracy;265
7.3.1.1; 6.3.1.1 Constitutional and institutional Features of India’s Political Regime;267
7.3.1.2; 6.3.1.2 Lok Sabha and Raj Sabha: Social Policy Making;268
7.3.1.2.1; The Rajya Sabha;270
7.3.1.2.2; The Lok Sabha;270
7.3.1.2.3; The two Houses and the Law Making Process;271
7.3.1.3; 6.3.1.3 Social Policy Making: Involvement of Legislative and Executive;272
7.3.1.4; 6.3.1.4 The Indian Social Security Administration;273
7.3.1.4.1; Ministry of Labour and Employment;275
7.3.1.4.2; Employees' Provident Fund Organisation;275
7.3.1.4.3; Employees' State Insurance Corporation;276
7.3.1.4.4; Department of Social Welfare;276
7.3.1.4.5; Ministries and Social Security Administration;277
7.3.2; 6.3.2 Political Chain of Command and Control in China;278
7.3.2.1; 6.3.2.1 CCP the Locus of Political Life;278
7.3.2.2; 6.3.2.2 The Politburo: A key actor;283
7.3.2.3; 6.3.2.3 The Chinese State, Social Security and Administration;284
7.3.2.3.1; The Chinese State Council;286
7.3.2.3.2; The National People’s Congress: The ‘rubber stamp’;287
7.3.2.3.3; The Ministry of Labour and Social Security;288
7.3.2.3.4; The ACFTU: Quasi Law Making Power;288
7.3.2.3.5; The Ministry of Civil Affairs;289
7.3.2.3.6; The Ministry of Health;289
7.3.2.3.7; The National Fund of Social Security Funds;289
7.4; 6.4 The State Format: Federalism and Decentralisation;290
7.4.1; 6.4.1 State Format and Social Security in India and China;291
7.4.1.1; 6.4.1.1 Chinese-Style Federalism;292
7.4.1.2; 6.4.1.2 India’s unusual Federalism: a Balance of self and shared Rule;295
7.4.1.3; 6.4.1.3 Pluralism: Performance differences on Local Levels;299
7.4.1.3.1; India’s Pluralism and Social Security Provision;299
7.4.1.3.2; Chinese Pluralism and Fiscal Constraints on Social Security Provision;302
7.4.2; 6.4.2 Comments on the State Format;304
7.5; 6.5 Bureaucracy and Longitude of Policy Making;306
7.5.1; 6.5.1 Chinese Bureaucracy and Long-term Planning;307
7.5.1.1; 6.5.1.1 Qualitative Constraints on Chinese Bureaucracy;307
7.5.1.1.1; Red capitalists and the CCP;308
7.5.1.1.2; Administrative Brain Drain;308
7.5.2; 6.5.2 India’s Bureaucracy and Long-term Planning;309
7.5.2.1; 6.5.2.1 Qualitative Constraints on India’s Bureaucracy;310
7.5.2.1.1; Excessive Regulations and Red Tape Bureaucracy;310
7.5.2.1.2; The Challenge of Corruption and Fraud;311
7.5.3; 6.5.3 Comments on bureaucratic Efficiency;311
8; VII. Political Parties and Social Seucirty Provison;313
8.1; 7.1 Political Parties, Party Effect and Policy Outcomes;314
8.2; 7.2 Political Entrepreneurs in India and China;317
8.2.1; 7.2.1 Relevance of Party Politics and Ideology;319
8.2.2; 7.2.2 Leading Political Parties in India and China;320
8.2.2.1; 7.2.2.1 The Asian Case and why parties matter;320
8.2.2.2; 7.2.2.2 The INC in the Indian political system;321
8.2.2.2.1; India’s democracy, the Nehru-Gandhi Dynasty, and Social Security Politics;326
8.2.2.2.2; From Nehru onwards to more Liberalism;327
8.2.2.2.3; Indira Gandhi’s radical Policy Changes;327
8.2.2.2.4; The Party System and its Constraints on Social Security Politics;329
8.2.2.2.5; The United Progressive Alliance (2004-2009) and its limited Power;330
8.2.2.2.6; The Coalition Government and its Constraints on Decision Making;331
8.2.2.2.7; The UPA: Social Security Objectives and Policy Outcomes;332
8.2.2.3; 7.2.2.3 The 1990s: The End of Personal Rule and Ideology?;333
8.2.2.3.1; The CCP and shifting Policy Guidelines (2004-2007);333
8.2.2.3.2; The CCP: from commanding to administrative Party;334
8.3; 7.3 Expanding the Veto Player Theorem;336
8.3.1; 7.3.1 Beyond the Veto Player Theorem – The Asian cases;337
8.3.2; 7.3.2 Political Parties as Engines for Clientelism;338
8.3.3; 7.3.3 The Case of Patronage-client Networks;339
8.3.3.1; 7.3.3.1 Indian Democracy, Vote Banks and Patronage;340
8.3.3.2; 7.3.3.2 Veto Players and Co-regents in China;341
8.4; 7.4 Comments on Party Politics, Ideology and Social Security;344
9; VIII. The Constitution, Rule of Law and State Capacity;346
9.1; 8.1 Rule of Law, Constitution and Social Security;346
9.1.1; 8.1.1 Democracies and Rule of Law;347
9.1.2; 8.1.2 The Rule of Law and Constitutions in Autocracies;348
9.1.3; 8.1.3 Law, the Constitution and Social Security Provision;348
9.1.4; 8.1.4 Comparing China and India;349
9.2; 8.2 The Chinese Case: From ‘??’ to ‘??’;350
9.2.1; Social Security Law in China and India;351
9.2.1.1; 8.2.1 The Constitution and Social Security in China;352
9.2.1.2; 8.2.2 The Constitution of 1982 and Social Security;353
9.2.1.3; 8.2.3 The Constitution: Constraints on Civil Rights;355
9.2.1.4; 8.2.4 Laws and Constraints on Social Security in China;357
9.3; 8.3 The Constitution and Social Security Politics in India;358
9.3.1; 8.3.1 The Supreme Court and Social Security;359
9.3.2; 8.3.2 Social Security Laws in India;362
9.3.2.1; Case: The Supreme Court and Promotional Social Security Schemes for Children;364
9.4; 8.4 Comments on the Constitutions and Social Security Laws;365
10; IX. Cooptation, Labour Organisations and Social Security;366
10.1; 9.1 Critical Elaboration of the typical Logic of Inquiry;367
10.2; 9.2 General Reflections on Unionism and Social Security;374
10.2.1; The Party-Union Relationship and three Dimensions of Cooptation;375
10.3; 9.3 Production Regimes and organisational Power;376
10.3.1; 9.3.1 Measuring the Level of Organised Interest;376
10.3.2; 9.3.2 China’s autocratic Cooperatism;379
10.3.3; 9.3.3 India’s State Capitalsim and Organised Labour;380
10.3.4; 9.3.4 Remarks on Typology and the Hybrid Types;381
10.4; 9.4 The party-centred Approach for India and China;382
10.4.1; 9.4.1 The Trinity of Party-State-Union;382
10.4.2; 9.4.2 Social Policy Making and the Party-State-Union Relationship;384
10.4.3; 9.4.3 Patronage in the Political Decision Making Process;385
10.4.4; 9.4.4 Constraints on the internal Decision Making Process;387
10.4.5; 9.4.5 Organised Labour and the Logic of Influence;389
10.5; 9.5 Political Patronage and the Party-Union Relationship;390
10.5.1; The Bombay Case: a concrete Example of the All-Indian Experience;394
10.5.2; Chinese paper unions;397
10.6; 9.6 Comments on Organised Labour and its Political Power;397
11; X. Conclusion;399
12; Bibliography;408
