Buch, Englisch, 208 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 230 mm, Gewicht: 376 g
Reihe: Bradford Books
Buch, Englisch, 208 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 230 mm, Gewicht: 376 g
Reihe: Bradford Books
ISBN: 978-0-262-19555-3
Verlag: Penguin Random House LLC
In the contentious debate among contemporary epistemologists and philosophers
regarding justification, there is one consensus: justification is distinct from knowledge; there are
justified beliefs that do not amount to knowledge, even if all instances of knowledge are instances
of justified belief. In Without Justification, Jonathan Sutton forcefully opposes this claim. He
proposes instead that justified belief simply is knowledge--not because there is more knowledge than
has been supposed, but because there are fewer justified beliefs. There are, he argues, no false
justified beliefs.Sutton suggests that the distinction between justified belief and knowledge is
drawn only in contemporary epistemology, and suggests furter that classic philosophers of both
ancient and modern times would not have questioned the idea that justification is identical to
knowledge.Sutton argues both that we do not (perhaps even cannot) have a serviceable notion of
justification that is distinct from knowledge and that we do not need one. We can get by better in
epistemology, he writes, without it. Sutton explores the topics of testimony and evidence, and
proposes an account of these two key epistemological topics that relies on the notion of knowledge
alone. He also addresses inference (both deductive and inductive), internalism versus externalism in
epistemology, functionalism, the paradox of the preface, and the lottery paradox. Sutton argues that
all of us--philosopher and nonphilosopher alike--should stick to what we know; we should believe
something only if we know it to be so. Further, we should not believe what someone tells us unless
we know that he knows what he is talking about. These views are radical, he argues, only in the
context of contemporary epistemology's ill-founded distinction between knowledge and
justification.
