E-Book, Englisch, Band 4, 722 Seiten
Tolksdorf Conceptions of Knowledge
1. Auflage 2011
ISBN: 978-3-11-025359-7
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
E-Book, Englisch, Band 4, 722 Seiten
Reihe: Berlin Studies in Knowledge ResearchISSN
ISBN: 978-3-11-025359-7
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Zielgruppe
Academics, Institutes, Libraries
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Contents;8
2;Introduction;12
3;Chapter One Knowledge, Ability, and Manifestation;82
3.1;Part One: Knowledge As Ability;82
3.1.1;Knowledge and Knowing: Ability and Manifestation;84
3.1.2;Wie Wissen funktioniert;112
3.2;Part Two : Knowledge Through Ability;138
3.2.1;Knowing Full Well;140
3.2.2;Die Natur von Fähigkeiten und der Zweck von Wissen;152
3.2.3;The Genealogy of the Concept of Knowledge and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology;170
3.2.4;Knowledge, Abilities, and Epistemic Luck: What Is Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and What Can It Do?;190
3.2.5;Knowledge as a Fallible Capacity;226
3.2.6;Part Three: Knowing-How;254
3.2.7;Knowing-How: Indispensable but Inscrutable;256
3.2.8;Knowledge-How, Linguistic Intellectualism, and Ryle’s Return;280
4;Chapter Two Knowledge in Situations: Contexts and Contrasts;316
4.1;Part One: Contextualism;316
4.1.1;Two Varieties of Knowledge;318
4.1.2;Nonindexical Contextualism – an Explication and Defense;340
4.2;Part Two : Contrastivism;362
4.2.1;What is Contrastivism?;364
4.2.2;Contrastive Knowledge;368
4.2.3;Contrastivism rather than Something Else? – On the Limits of Epistemic Contrastivism;406
4.2.4;Contrastive Knowledge: Reply to Baumann;422
4.2.5;PS: Response to Schaffer’s Reply;436
5;Chapter Three Challenging Justification - The Nature and Structure of Justification;444
5.1;Verantwortlichkeit und Verlässlichkeit;446
5.2;Justification, Deontology, and Voluntary Control;472
5.3;Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem;498
5.4;Das einfache Argument;520
5.5;What Is Transmission Failure?;538
6;Chapter Four Varieties and Forms ofKnowledge: Animal, Phenomenal, and Practical Knowledge;544
6.1;Epistemology and Cognitive Ethology;546
6.2;Non-Human Knowledge and Non-Human Agency;568
6.3;Phänomenales Wissen und der Hintergrund;600
6.4;Rechtliches Wissen;628
7;Chapter Five Skepticism: Pragmatic Answers ?;638
7.1;Wittgensteins Zweifel;640
7.2;Skepticism, Contextualism and Entitlement;660
7.3;Wittgenstein and Williamson on Knowing and Believing;682
8;Notes on Contributors;702