E-Book, Englisch, 469 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 227 mm
Weber / Ottmann Reshaping the European Union
1. Auflage 2018
ISBN: 978-3-8452-8720-1
Verlag: Nomos
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
E-Book, Englisch, 469 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 227 mm
ISBN: 978-3-8452-8720-1
Verlag: Nomos
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Cover;1
2; Introduction;20
3; I. History of the European Union;29
3.1; 1. Origins of the European Community;30
3.1.1; 1.1 Ideas on a United Europe;30
3.1.2; 1.2 National Interests;33
3.1.3; 1.3 Influence of the USA;36
3.1.4; 1.4 Cold War;37
3.2; 2. Foundation of the European Community;37
3.2.1; 2.1 European Coal and Steel Community Treaty;39
3.2.2; 2.2 European Defence Community;41
3.2.3; 2.3 Evolution of the European Economic Community Treaty;41
3.2.4; 2.4 European Economic Community Treaty;44
3.3; 3. Development after the European Economic CommunityTreaty;45
3.3.1; 3.1 European Economic Community and De Gaulle;46
3.3.2; 3.2 Two Important Decisions of the European Court of Justice;48
3.3.3; 3.3 Deepening and Enlargement of the European Community;49
3.4; 4. The Dynamic of the 1980 s;51
3.5; 5. Euro and Eurozone Crisis;53
3.6; 6. Political Events after 1985;58
3.7; 7. Further Development of the European Union;60
3.8; 8. Comment;62
3.9; 9. Conclusion;65
4; II. Basic Issues;67
4.1; 1. The Constitutive Treaties;68
4.2; 2. Verfasstheit of the European Union;69
4.2.1; 2.1 Arguments pro Constitution;70
4.2.2; 2.2 Arguments contra Constitution;73
4.2.3; 2.3 Discussion;75
4.3; 3. The European Union as International Organization;76
4.4; 4. Supranationality of the European Union;77
4.5; 5. Three Intriguing Theories;79
4.5.1; 5.1 Intergovernmentalism;80
4.5.2; 5.2 Supranationalism;80
4.5.3; 5.3 Constructivism;81
4.5.4; 5.4 Comment;82
4.6; 6. Sovereignty;82
4.7; 7. Constitutional Pluralism;85
4.7.1; 7.1 Discussion;87
4.8; 8. Legitimacy;88
4.9; 9. Accountability;92
4.10; 10. Purposes and Goals;92
4.11; 11. Conclusion;95
5; III. Structure and Functioning of the European Union;98
5.1; 1. General Remarks on European Union Institutions;99
5.2; 2. European Commission;100
5.2.1; 2.1 Tasks of the Commission;101
5.2.2; 2.2 Composition of the Commission;102
5.2.3; 2.3 Structure of and Voting within the Commission;104
5.2.4; 2.4 Network between European Union and Member States;105
5.2.5; 2.5 Agencies;106
5.2.6; 2.6 State of the Union Address;108
5.2.7; 2.7 Comment;109
5.3; 3. European Council;110
5.3.1; 3.1 Shared Executive Power;112
5.3.2; 3.2 President of the European Council;112
5.3.3; 3.3 General Affairs Council;113
5.3.4; 3.4 Comment;114
5.4; 4. Council;114
5.4.1; 4.1 Composition of the Council;115
5.4.2; 4.2 Decision-making in the Council;115
5.4.3; 4.3 Council Configurations;116
5.4.4; 4.4 Presidency of the Council;117
5.4.5; 4.5 Assisting Committees;117
5.4.6; 4.6 Intergovernmental Conference;119
5.4.7; 4.7 Foreign Affairs and Security Policy;119
5.4.8; 4.8 Comment;120
5.5; 5. European Parliament;120
5.5.1; 5.1 Composition of the European Parliament;121
5.5.2; 5.2 Political Groups in the European Parliament;122
5.5.3; 5.3 Parliamentary Organs;123
5.5.4; 5.4 Decision-making in the European Parliament;125
5.5.4.1; 5.4.1 Legislative Functions;125
5.5.4.2; 5.4.2 Budgetary Functions;126
5.5.4.3; 5.4.3 Supervisory Functions;126
5.5.4.4; 5.4.4 Elective Functions;126
5.5.5; 5.5 Comment;127
5.6; 6. European Court of Justice;127
5.7; 7. European Central Bank;128
5.7.1; 7.1 Comment;130
5.8; 8. Court of Auditors;132
5.9; 9. Order of Competences;133
5.9.1; 9.1 Union Competences;133
5.9.2; 9.2 Principle of Conferral;134
5.9.3; 9.3 Subsidiarity and Proportionality;135
5.9.4; 9.4 Enhanced Cooperation;135
5.9.5; 9.5 Comment;136
5.10; 10. Summary;137
5.11; 11. Conclusion;139
6; IV. The European Court of Justice – a Controversial Institution?;141
6.1; 1. Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice;142
6.1.1; 1.1 Basic Considerations;142
6.1.2; 1.2 Legal Order of the European Union;143
6.1.3; 1.3 Direct Effect;145
6.1.4; 1.4 Regulations;147
6.1.5; 1.5 Directives;147
6.1.6; 1.6 Supremacy of the Union law;149
6.1.7; 1.7 Preliminary References;155
6.2; 2. Debate on the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice;156
6.2.1; 2.1 Supportive Opinions;156
6.2.2; 2.2 Opinions of the Critics;160
6.3; 3. Other Recent Opinions of Legal Scholars;162
6.4; 4. Political Question Doctrine;170
6.4.1; 4.1 Political Question Doctrine in the USA;170
6.4.2; 4.2 Political Question Doctrine in the European Union;172
6.5; 5. Discussion;174
6.6; 6. Recommendations;179
6.7; 7. Conclusion;180
7; V. Eurosystem and Eurozone Crisis;182
7.1; 1. Basic Issues;183
7.1.1; 1.1 Currency Unions;183
7.1.2; 1.2 Exchange Rate Regimens;184
7.1.3; 1.3 The Burden of Public Debt;185
7.1.4; 1.4 Lessons from Previous Financial Crises;188
7.1.5; 1.5 Sovereign versus Corporate Bankruptcy;191
7.1.6; 1.6 Peculiarities of the Bank System;191
7.2; 2. Creation of the Eurosystem;193
7.3; 3. The Beginning of the Great Recession;198
7.4; 4. The Eurozone Crisis;201
7.4.1; 4.1 Competitive Weakness in the Eurozone;202
7.4.2; 4.2 Remedies in Ireland and the Baltic States;204
7.4.3; 4.3 Competition from Middle-East and Eastern Europe;205
7.4.4; 4.4 Interest Rates;205
7.4.5; 4.5 Fiscal Problems in the Eurozone;206
7.4.6; 4.6 Private Wealth within the Eurozone;208
7.4.7; 4.7 The Eurosystem in the Crisis;208
7.4.8; 4.8 The Effect of Moral Hazard;213
7.5; 5. Target Balances;214
7.6; 6. Handling the Current Account Deficit;216
7.7; 7. Rescue Programmes;217
7.8; 8. Structural Reforms and Austerity;220
7.8.1; 8.1 Critique on the Troika;222
7.9; 9. The Banking Union;224
7.10; 10. The Challenge of Fiscal Union;231
7.10.1; 10.1 Fiscal Federalism;232
7.10.1.1; 10.1.1 Fiscal Federalism in the USA;232
7.10.1.2; 10.1.2 Fiscal Federalism in Switzerland;234
7.10.2; 10.2 Disregard of the Maastricht Criteria;234
7.10.3; 10.3 Does the Eurozone Need a Fiscal Union?;235
7.10.4; 10.4 Fiscal Recommendations;238
7.11; 11. Previous Suggestions for Reshaping the Eurosystem;238
7.11.1; 11.1 Transfer Union, Debt Mutualisation, and Similar Proposals;239
7.11.2; 11.2 Self-responsibility of Every Eurozone Country;242
7.11.3; 11.3 Reconciliation of Both Standpoints;246
7.12; 12. The Challenge of Debt;248
7.13; 13. An Insolvency Procedure;250
7.14; 14. Exit from the Eurozone;250
7.15; 15. Fate of the Future Eurozone;254
7.15.1; 15.1 Dissolution of the Eurozone;254
7.15.2; 15.2 Price Adjustment in the Eurozone;255
7.15.3; 15.3 Eurobonds and Transfer Union;257
7.16; 16. Own Reform Proposals;257
7.17; 17. Conclusion;261
8; VI. Defects of the Existing European Union;263
8.1; 1. The Ambiguity of the Ever-Closer-Union Clause;263
8.2; 2. Challenge of Diversity of the Member States;264
8.2.1; 2.1 Inequality of Size and Population;265
8.2.2; 2.2 Diversity of Background;266
8.2.3; 2.3 Cultural and Religious Diversity;267
8.2.4; 2.4 Small versus Large Member States;272
8.2.5; 2.5 The Challenge of the Equality Claim;273
8.2.6; 2.6 Comment;275
8.3; 3. Defects of Democracy;276
8.4; Democracy has been a fundamental principle of the Western nation state. In some Western nation states, democracy has been having a long tradition. In other nation states, democracy has been introduced only recently as will be discussed in chapter VII. The EU is not a state. The question may therefore be justified whether the EU is a democratic polity or whether it is at least on the way of becoming a democratic polity. Democracy is mentioned in the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty and Articles 9 to 12 TEU delineate the “Provisions on democratic principles”. Do these provisions establish the democracy in the EU? This subchapter will be concerned with this question.;276
8.4.1; 3.1 Equality and Citizenship;276
8.4.2; 3.2 Defects of Representative Democracy;277
8.4.3; 3.3 Democratic Deficit of the European Union;278
8.4.4; 3.4 Defects of Parliamentary Representation;280
8.5; 4. Defects of Popular Sovereignty;283
8.6; The lack of a demos of the EU corresponds to the lack of popular sovereignty. The latter is of fundamental importance in a modern democracy. The demos should be the sovereign in a polity of the Western civilization. Since the EU does not have a demos, it cannot rest on popular sovereignty. In this context, it is interesting that Jean Monnet was keen enough to deny the people the experience for creating the European Community (see Monnet 1978: 465). This attitude of a European “Saint” was not supportive for the eventual idea of popular sovereignty in the EU. Instead, the promotion of European integration has largely been a project of elites. The importance of the public in the process of shaping the EU is discussed in chapter IX.;283
8.7; 5. Defects of the Separation of Powers;284
8.7.1; 5.1 Defects of the Horizontal Separation of Powers;285
8.7.2; 5.2 Defects of the Vertical Separation of Powers;287
8.8; 6. Deficient Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice;289
8.9; Important defects of the judiciary of the EU have been described in chapter IV and in the previous section and shall not be repeated here. Moreover, Antoine Vauchez added a couple of additional examples which demonstrated the overextension of the mandate of the ECJ (see Vauchez 2016: 1-5 and 28-29).;289
8.10; 7. Defects of the Law-making Process in the European Union;289
8.11; Presently, the European Commission has the monopoly concerning the initiative of the law- making although the Commission is not an accountable institution. This is an unsatisfactory condition. Rather, democratically legitimized and accountable institutions like the national parliaments and governments and the partially democratically legitimized European Parliament should primarily receive the right to initiate law proposals. This also refers to the Council. The author suggests that the Commission can be included in this initiation process, mainly as an administration with considerable expertise.;289
8.12; 8. Deficient Activities of the European Central Bank System;290
8.13; In the EU, there are presently 19 member states whose currency is the euro and ten member states having their own currency. This dichotomy is presumably not advantageous for the EU for at least two reasons. First, the monetary capacity of the Eurosystem is reduced because a couple of EU member states are not members of the Eurozone. Secondly, the fact that nine (eight) member states do not participate in the Eurosystem presumably means that they mistrust the Eurosystem.;290
8.14; 9. Lack of Duties;291
8.15; In chapter II, it has been pointed out that the Lisbon Treaty lists a considerable amount of rights of the citizens of the EU but not a single obligation or duty of the citizens. The question may be allowed whether a polity can survive in the long run if the citizens of this polity have many rights, but no duties specified in the EU Treaties.;291
8.16; 10. A Misarranged State of the Union Address;291
8.17; The State of the Union Address delivered by the President of the Commission was arranged between the Commission and the European Parliament in 2010. The basis for this arrangement was a framework agreement between both EU institutions mentioned. This arrangement was not foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty or in any other EU Treaty. Chapter III outlines that the State of the Union Address was an imitation of the State of the Union Congress Information by the US President according to Article 2 (3) of the US Constitution. In chapter III, it is also pointed out that the US President and the US Congress are democratically legitimized institutions. By contrast, the Commission is not democratically accountable and the European Parliament is only a partly legitimized institution. Moreover, the Commission tries to underline its “executive” power. The endeavours of the Commission and the European Parliament to establish a State of the Union Address by the back door is violating the democratic legitimacy of the EU. The State of the Union Address in the present form can therefore not be tolerated any longer. A suggestion is being made in Chapter X how a State of the Union Address could be arranged in the future.;291
8.18; 11. Conclusion;292
8.19; The European enthusiasts have presumably not foreseen the numerous problems which can arise with a united Europe. Yet, most if not all member states of the EU possess provisions for a united Europe in their Constitutions. But the framers of these provisions presumably did not seem to take into consideration that the united EU which they envisaged would be associated with the defects described in this chapter.;292
9; VII. European Nation State versus European Union;294
9.1; 1. Historical Aspects;295
9.1.1; 1.1 The View of the Comparative Historians;295
9.1.2; 1.2 Features of the State in the Light of History;297
9.1.3; 1.3 History of the European Nation State;299
9.2; 2. Political Order and the State;301
9.2.1; 2.1 Good and Bad Political Order;301
9.2.2; 2.2 Nature of the State;302
9.2.3; 2.3 Staatlichkeit within the European Union;303
9.3; 3. Democracy;305
9.3.1; 3.1 Democracy in the Greek Polis;305
9.3.2; 3.2 Democracy and the Modern State;306
9.3.3; 3.3 Types of Democracy;307
9.3.4; 3.4 Preconditions of Democracy;311
9.3.5; 3.5 Democratic Legitimacy;313
9.3.6; 3.6 Limits of Democracy;314
9.3.7; 3.7 Advantage of the Democratic State;315
9.3.8; 3.8 Democracy of the EU Member States;315
9.3.9; 3.9 European Union versus State Democracy;315
9.4; 4. Parliamentarianism;317
9.4.1; 4.1 The National Parliament;317
9.4.2; 4.2 National Parliaments in the European Union;318
9.4.3; 4.3 European Parliament;319
9.4.4; 4.4 Comment;320
9.5; 5. Popular Sovereignty;320
9.5.1; 5.1 Popular Sovereignty in the Nation State;321
9.5.2; 5.2 Popular Sovereignty in the European Union;322
9.5.3; 5.3 Popular Sovereignty and National Constitutions;322
9.5.4; 5.4 Comment;323
9.6; 6. Separation of Powers;324
9.6.1; 6.1 Separation of Powers in the State;325
9.6.2; 6.2 Separation of Powers in the European Union;326
9.6.3; 6.3 Comment;326
9.7; 7. Rule of Law;327
9.7.1; 7.1 European Rule of Law Tradition;327
9.7.2; 7.2 Rule of Law and the Classics;328
9.7.3; 7.3 Principles of the Rule of Law;329
9.7.4; 7.4 Comment;334
9.7.5; 7.5 Rule of Law in the European Union;335
9.8; 8. Conclusion;336
10; VIII. Models for a Future European Union;338
10.1; 1. A Short History of Federations;340
10.1.1; 1.1 The Polis and its Federations;340
10.1.2; 1.2 Empires;341
10.1.3; 1.3 The Nation State;343
10.2; 2. The Present Status of the European Union;343
10.3; 3. Reforms and Models of the Future European Union;348
10.4; 4. Empire and Neo-medievalism;355
11; IX. The People and the Making of the European Union Treaties;360
11.1; 1. Public Participation and Popular Sovereignty in the European Union;362
11.2; As chapter I indicates, the main origins of the EU were idealistic ideas, interests of the nation states, and the American influence. Taking these origins into consideration, this subchapter deals with the question whether there was sufficient room left for the participation of the people and popular sovereignty during the foundation of the EU.;362
11.2.1; 1.1 Public Participation;362
11.2.2; 1.2 Popular Sovereignty;364
11.3; 2. Public Participation and Popular Sovereignty in the USA;365
11.3.1; 2.1 Public Participation;365
11.3.2; 2.2 Popular Sovereignty;369
11.4; 3. Discussion;371
11.4.1; 3.1 Appropriate Public Participation;371
11.4.2; 3.2 Differences between Europe and USA;374
11.4.3; 3.3 Similarity of Procedures in Different Polities;375
11.4.4; 3.4 Popular Sovereignty;376
11.4.5; 3.5 Are the People Dangerous?;377
11.4.6; 3.6 Consequences;379
11.5; 4. Recommendations;380
11.6; In this subchapter, recommendations concerning the public participation in the future EU are being made. (1) The people of all EU member states should be given the possibility to discuss a future EU Treaty of the Lisbon-Treaty-type whenever such a treaty is proposed by national parliamentarians, national governments, EU institutions, or individuals. (2) In every EU member state, capable and renowned persons should be elected to become representatives of special national conventions; the special national convention of a given EU member state only has one task, namely to provide advice to the government of its EU member state for the negotiations establishing a forthcoming future EU Treaty. (3) Each of the 28 (27) special national conventions should discuss and agree on a draft proposal and should elect one or a few expert delegate(s) for a Convention Committee. (4) Each Convention Committee should submit the draft proposal to the government of its member state. (5) The national parliaments also form a Parliamentary Committee with one or a few parliamentarians who design a draft proposal for the government. (6) Preferably, both Committees mentioned coordinate their proposals, possibly even together with representatives of the government. (7) The government representatives, possibly joined by representatives of both Committees mentioned, enter into negotiations with the governments of the other EU member states in an intergovernmental conference. (8) After approval of the future EU Treaty by the governments of the EU member states, the national parliaments need to ratify the future EU Treaty. (9) A referendum may be necessary according to the constitution of some EU member states.;380
11.7; 5. Conclusion;381
12; X. Proposals for a Reshaped European Union;383
12.1; 1. Previous Suggestions for a Future European Union;384
12.1.1; 1.1 Ideas and Models for a United Europe;384
12.1.2; 1.2 Nation State and Governance;387
12.1.3; 1.3 Deviations from the Treaties and Agreements;390
12.1.4; 1.4 Democratic Legitimacy and Accountability;392
12.1.5; 1.5 Promises and Shaken Expectations;395
12.1.6; 1.6 Challenges;397
12.2; 2. General Considerations;401
12.3; 3. Purposes of the Future European Union;404
12.4; 4. Supranationality and Limited Supranationality;406
12.4.1; 4.1 Supranationality;406
12.4.2; 4.2 Limited Supranationality;408
12.5; 5. The European Union as Unique Polity;410
12.6; 6. Reign, Structure, and Functioning of the Future European Union;410
12.6.1; 6.1 The Future European Council;411
12.6.2; 6.2 The Future Council;412
12.6.3; 6.3 The Future Chamber of National Parliamentarians;412
12.6.4; 6.4 The Future European Parliament;412
12.6.5; 6.5 The Future European Commission;412
12.6.6; 6.6 The Future European Court of Justice;413
12.6.7; 6.7 The Future European Central Bank;414
12.7; 7. The Future Treaty-making;415
12.8; 8. Law-making in the Future European Union;416
12.9; 9. Uniformity of Law and Principles;418
12.9.1; 9.1 Differentiation of Law;419
12.9.2; 9.2 Uniformity of Principles and Values;419
12.10; 10. Equality of the Member States;420
12.11; 11. Sound Finances;421
12.12; 12. Future Defence Policy;424
12.13; 13. Future Foreign and Security Policy;425
12.14; 14. Implications of the Brexit;426
12.15; 15. The Challenge of Immigration;429
12.16; 16. Admission of New Members;432
12.17; 17. Future State of the Union Address;433
12.18; 18. Conclusion;434
13; References;437
14; Name Index;458
15; Subject Index;462
