Wu Implicit Incentives in International Joint Ventures

An Experimental Study
2012
ISBN: 978-3-8349-7076-3
Verlag: Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag Gabler
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 258 Seiten, eBook

Reihe: International Management Studies

Managers in international joint ventures work with resources contributed by investors from multiple nationalities. Fan Wu shows through a series of experimental studies among students and managers from China, South Korea, Germany, and the USA that cultural affinity between the manager and one of the investors and career perspectives with one of the investors are strongly motivating managers to make biased decisions. The two mechanisms can be used to balance each other out in staffing key positions in international joint ventures for optimal control over managerial decisions.

Dr. Fan Wu received her Ph.D. in Management from the Otto von Guericke University of Magdeburg under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff (Chair in International Management).

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Wu, Fan

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Foreword;6
2;Preface;8
3;Table of Contents;10
4;List of Tables;13
5;List of Figures;15
6;List of Abbreviations;17
7;List of Variables;19
8;1. Implicit incentives of international joint venture managers – an introduction;21
9;2. Joint venture manager as a common agency;27
9.1;2.1 Delegation of management to a joint venture manager;27
9.1.1;2.1.1 Importance of joint venture manager’s loyalty as a consequence of incomplete contracting;29
9.1.2;2.1.2 Location specificity of joint venture assets;32
9.1.3;2.1.3 Implicit incentives for an international joint venture manager;37
9.1.4;2.1.4 Cultural affinity as an implicit incentive;37
9.1.5;2.1.5 Career perspective as an implicit incentive;45
9.2;2.2 Choice of research methods;54
9.3;2.3 Countries in the samples;55
10;3. Expert interviews among Sino-German jointventure and parent firm managers;61
10.1;3.1 Questionnaire development and pilot interviews;61
10.2;3.2 Selection of the sample and contact to the companies;63
10.3;3.3 The interview procedure, data input, cross inspection and conversion;67
10.4;3.4 Interview results on the influence of nationality and career perspectives;68
10.4.1;3.4.1 The influence of nationality on SGJV managers’ decisions;68
10.4.2;3.4.2 The career perspective of SGJV managers;74
11;4. Cultural affinity of managers of internationaljoint ventures: an experimental study;78
11.1;4.1 The model, the equilibrium, and the hypotheses;78
11.1.1;4.1.1 The model;79
11.1.2;4.1.2 Game-theoretic equilibrium (payoff-maximizing agents);83
11.2;4.2 Experimental hypotheses, design and procedure;84
11.3;4.3 Data analysis;91
11.3.1;4.3.1 Managers’ allocation decisions – Hypothesis 1a;91
11.3.2;4.3.2 Investors’ investment decisions – Hypothesis 1b;99
11.4;4.4 Summary and discussion of the cultural affinityexperiments;103
12;5. Career perspective for managers of internationaljoint venture managers: an experimental study;106
12.1;5.1 The model and the equilibrium;107
12.1.1;5.1.1 The model with ex ante offers;107
12.1.2;5.1.2 Game-theoretic equilibrium (payoff-maximizing agents);112
12.1.3;5.1.3 Alternative timing of the offers: the model with ex post offers;116
12.2;5.2 Experimental hypotheses, design and procedure;117
12.3;5.3 Data analysis;121
12.3.1;5.3.1 Managers’ allocation decisions – Hypotheses 2a and 3a;121
12.3.2;5.3.2 Investors’ transfer payment offers – Hypotheses 2b and 3b;126
12.3.3;5.3.3 Overbidding for the manager’s favor;133
12.4;5.4 Summary and discussion of the career perspectiveexperiments;136
13;6. The effects of former acquaintance and work experience: alternative samples;138
13.1;6.1 Social distance and demographical characteristics of students and managers;139
13.1.1;6.1.1 Social distance due to the players’ former acquaintance;139
13.1.2;6.1.2 Differences between students and managers;141
13.2;6.2 The experimental model and equilibrium;145
13.3;6.3 Experiments with Group Student and MBA samples;146
13.4;6.4 Results from experiments with the Group Student and MBA samples;148
13.4.1;6.4.1 Managers’ allocation decisions;149
13.4.2;6.4.2 Investors’ transfer payment offers;150
13.5;6.5 Results from the discussion with the MBA subjects;155
13.6;6.6 Summary and discussion of the alternative samples;164
14;7. Managerial implications and research outlook;166
14.1;Implications for personnel management and policy making;168
14.2;Future research perspectives;170
15;List of References;173
16;Appendices;187
16.1; Appendix 1: Hofstede’s index scores for China, Germany, South Korea, and the U.S.A;187
16.2;Appendix 2: Questionnaire of Sino-German joint venture in-terviews;188
16.3;Appendix 3: Proof of game-theoretical equilibrium;214
16.4;Appendix 4: Experimental instructions of cultural affinity: Chinese manager treatment (in the U.S.);216
16.5;Appendix 5: Experimental instructions of cultural affinity: non-Chinese manager treatment (in the U.S.);220
16.6;Appendix 6: Experimental instructions of career perspective: Ex_Ante_ Offer treatment;224
16.7;Appendix 7: Experimental instructions of career perspective: Ex_Post_ Offer treatment;228
16.8;Appendix 8: Scripts of MBA discussion sessions;232
16.8.1;Appendix 8.1: Discussion after the first and second sessions;233
16.8.2;Appendix 8.2: Discussion after the third and fourth sessions;250

Über Autor(innen)

Dr. Fan Wu received her Ph.D. in Management from the Otto von Guericke University of Magdeburg under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Birgitta Wolff (Chair in International Management).