Beyond Conceptual Dualism

Ontology of Consciousness, Mental Causation, and Holism in John R. Searle’s Philosophy of Mind
Erscheinungsjahr 2008
ISBN: 978-90-420-2466-3
Verlag: Brill | Rodopi

Buch, Englisch, Band 196, 196 Seiten, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 473 g

Reihe: Value Inquiry Book Series / Cognitive Science

This book is a systematic analysis of John R. Searle’s philosophy of mind. Searle’s view of mind, as a set of subjective and biologically embodied processes, can account for our being part of nature qua mindful beings. This model finds support in neuroscience and offers reliable solutions to the problems of consciousness, mental causation, and the self.

“The main theme of Vicari’s book is the exposition and explanation of my various writings about the mind. I must say that he has understood me and explained my views better than any other author I have read. Not content merely to present the philosophical arguments, he provides a powerful and extensive discussion of current neurobiological research, especially the work of Gerald M. Edelman, Giulio Tononi, and Antonio Damasio. Vicari sees how my work is related to, and supportive of, the best current work in neurobiology.”
John R. Searle

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Francesc Forn I ARGIMON: Editorial Foreword: Special Series in Cognitive Science
John R. SEARLE: Guest Foreword
Preface
Introduction
One: Problems and Theories: The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary Philosophical Debate
Two: Biological Naturalism: A Naturalistic and Non-Reductive Ontology of Consciousness
Three: Functionalistic Models of Consciousness: Dennett, Chalmers, and the Desubstantialization of Mind
Four: Holism and Mental Causation in the Theory of Intentionality
Five: John Searle and Contemporary Neuroscience. Holism, Mental Causation, and the Roots of Subjectivity
Conclusion
Works Cited
About the Author
Index