The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination

2001
ISBN: 978-0-7923-6764-2
Verlag: Springer

Buch, Englisch, Band 294, 266 Seiten

Reihe: Synthese Library

The central question in the philosophy of time is whether time is tensed or tenseless, viz., whether the moments of time are objectively past, present or future, or whether they are ordered merely by the tenseless temporal relations earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than. In this book and the companion volume The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination, Craig undertakes the first thorough appraisal of the arguments for and against the tensed and tenseless theories of time. The discussions range widely over issues in the philosophy of language, phenomenology, relativity theory, philosophy of space and time, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion. The Tenseless Theory of Time sets out to discover whether the ineliminability of tense from language and our experience of tense warrants a belief in its objective ontological status, or whether the defeaters raised by McTaggart's paradox and the Myth of Passageserve to undermine any warrant that the tensed theory of time may be supposed to enjoy.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Craig, William Lane

Craig, W.L.

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Metaphysik, Ontologie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschaftsphilosophie
• Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften: Allgemeines Wissenschaften: Theorie, Epistemologie, Methodik
• Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaften Sprachphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Phänomenologie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sprachphilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Preface. Part I: Arguments for a B-Theory of Time. Section 1: The Special Theory of Relativity. 1. SR and the B-Theory. 2. Time and Its Measures. 3. The Epistemological Foundations of SR. 4. SR's Elimination of Metaphysical Time. 5. The Vindication of Lorentz. Section 2: The Mind-Dependence of Temporal Becoming. 6. Three Arguments for the Mind-Dependence of Becoming. Part II: Arguments Against a B-Theory of Time. Section 1: Philosophical Objections. 7. The `Spatializing' of Time. 8. Incoherence of the Mind-Dependence of Becoming. 9. The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. Section 2: Theological Objections. 10. Creatio ex Nihilo. Bibliography. Subject Index. Proper Name Index.