Cumpa / Tegtmeier Phenomenological Realism Versus Scientific Realism

Reinhardt Grossmann - David M. Armstrong Metaphysical Correspondence
1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-3-11-032606-2
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 139 Seiten

Reihe: ISSN

The two eminent metaphysicians Armstrong and Grossmann exchanged letters for ten years in which they discussed crucial points of their respective ontologies. They have a common basis. Both do metaphysics proper and not linguistic philosophy. Both advocate universals and acknowledge the key position of the category of states of affairs. However, they differ on the simplicity of universals and the nature of states of affairs. There is also a fundamental methodological disagreement between them. Armstrong accepts only the evidence of natural science and has a materialist view on mind while Grossmann is a dualist and grants also the same evidential status to the phenomenological data of perception and introspection. The letters are grouped into three phases. The first is the issue of universals, the second the ontological analysis of laws of nature and the third the ontology of numbers. The book contains also longer comments and reviews, partly not published until now.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Cumpa, Javier

Tegtmeier, Erwin

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Metaphysik, Ontologie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschaftsphilosophie
• Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften: Allgemeines Wissenschaften: Theorie, Epistemologie, Methodik
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Phänomenologie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Table of Contents;5
2;Acknowledgements;9
3;Preface;11
4;Introduction;13
5;Beginning: Universals;19
5.1;The Start;21
5.2;On the Simplicity of Universals;25
5.3;On the Complexity of Universals;26
5.4;The Phenomenological Argument for the Simplicity of Universals;27
5.5;The Scientific Argument for the Complexity of Universals;28
5.6;Objections;30
5.7;A Reply to Objections;31
5.8;A Legacy: Gustav Bergman;33
5.9;A Legacy: John Anderson;34
5.10;The Nature of Universals;35
5.11;A Reply;51
5.11.1;1. Grossmann on Exemplification;52
5.11.2;2. Are there Conjunctive Properties?;55
5.11.3;3. Structural Properties;58
5.11.4;4. Ontology and the Physical Universe;59
5.12;Objections;63
5.13;A Reply to Objections;69
5.14;Universals and Classes: A Question;72
5.15;Universals and Classes: An Answer;73
5.16;Objections;74
5.17;A Reply to Objections;75
6;Middle: Laws of Nature;77
6.1;Laws of Nature as Quantified Facts;79
6.2;Laws of Nature as Connectionsbetween Universals;80
6.3;An Objection;82
6.4;A Reply;84
6.5;An Epistemological Problem:The Synthetic A Priori Truths;85
6.6;A Solution: Causation;87
6.7;An Objection: Induction;89
7;End:The Nature of Numbers;91
7.1;A Coincidence;93
7.2;Numbers Tied to Aggregates;94
7.3;An Objection: On Mereological Categories;95
7.4;A Reply: On Mereological Categories;98
7.5;Aggregates and Sets: A Question;99
7.6;Aggregates and Sets: An Answer;101
7.7;A Problem: Wholes and Mereological Sums;103
7.8;A Solution: The Identity Conditions for Mereological Sums;105
7.9;Concluding Remarks on Numbers andMereology;107
8;Appendices;109
8.1;1. Reinhardt Grossmann’s Ontology;111
8.2;2. Comments on Armstrong’s “Universals”;127
8.3;3. Comments on Grossmann’s“The Existence of the World”;131
8.4;Bibliography;137