International Tax Policy

Erscheinungsjahr 2018
ISBN: 978-1-107-53103-1
Verlag: Cambridge University Press

Buch, Englisch, 261 Seiten, Paperback, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 385 g

Reihe: Cambridge Tax Law Series

Bringing a unique voice to international taxation, this book argues against the conventional support of multilateral co-operation in favour of structured competition as a way to promote both justice and efficiency in international tax policy. Tsilly Dagan analyzes international taxation as a decentralized market, where governments have increasingly become strategic actors. While many of the challenges of the current international tax regime derive from this decentralized competitive structure, Dagan argues that curtailing competition through centralization is not necessarily the answer. Conversely, competition - if properly calibrated and notwithstanding its dubious reputation - is conducive, rather than detrimental, to both efficiency and global justice. International Tax Policy begins with the basic normative goals of income taxation, explaining how competition transforms them and analyzing the strategic game states play on the bilateral and multilateral level. It then considers the costs and benefits of co-operation and competition in terms of efficiency and justice.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Dagan, Tsilly

Fachgebiete

• Rechtswissenschaften Internationales Recht und Europarecht Internationales Recht Internationales Handels-, Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsrecht
• Rechtswissenschaften Steuerrecht
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Öffentliche Finanzwirtschaft, Besteuerung

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction; 1. Dilemmas of tax policy in a globalized economy; 2. Global planners and strategic players; 3. The tax treaties myth; 4. Costs of multilateral coordination; 5. Cooperation and its discontents; 6. International tax and global justice; Conclusion and the road ahead.

Über Autor(innen)

Dagan, Tsilly
Tsilly Dagan is a Professor of Law at Bar-Ilan University, Israel. She is a leading tax theorist who has published extensively on a broad range of tax-related issues and distinctively combines tools from game theory and political philosophy to challenge the field's conventional wisdoms.