De Pascalis | Credit Ratings and Market Over-Reliance | Buch | 978-90-04-34184-5 | sack.de

Buch, Englisch, Band 15, 234 Seiten, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 529 g

Reihe: Nijhoff International Trade Law Series

De Pascalis

Credit Ratings and Market Over-Reliance

An International Legal Analysis
Erscheinungsjahr 2017
ISBN: 978-90-04-34184-5
Verlag: Brill

An International Legal Analysis

Buch, Englisch, Band 15, 234 Seiten, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 529 g

Reihe: Nijhoff International Trade Law Series

ISBN: 978-90-04-34184-5
Verlag: Brill


Taking position from the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis, Credit Ratings and Market Over-reliance: An International Legal Analysis by Francesco De Pascalis provides an in depth legal and regulatory analysis of the concept of over-reliance in the use of ratings and how regulation facilitates over-reliance is different from mere reliance on credit ratings. Not only does the book provide an incisive doctrinal analysis of the concept of over-reliance, it also considers over-reliance from a comparative and international perspective by reviewing legal and regulatory developments under European Union and US law and how over-reliance has been addressed in international financial regulation.
De Pascalis Credit Ratings and Market Over-Reliance jetzt bestellen!

Autoren/Hrsg.


Weitere Infos & Material


Foreword
Preface
List of Abbreviations

1 Reliance versus Over-reliance
1.1 Contextual Setting
1.2 A Holistic Study of Over-reliance
1.3 Book Structure

2 The ‘Good’ Aspects of Credit Ratings: A Basis for Reliance
Introduction
2.1 The Importance of Credit Ratings in the Financial Markets: The Reliance of the Private Sector
2.1.1 The Credit Rating Industry: Origins and Development
2.1.2 Credit Ratings: Categories and Formation Process
2.1.3 Credit Ratings as Opinions on Creditworthiness
2.1.4 cra Informational Services
2.1.5 The cra Monitoring Services: Outlook and Watch-List Procedures
2.1.6 Users of cra Services
2.2 The Public Sector’s Reliance on Credit Ratings
2.2.1 cras as Certification Providers
2.2.2 Clarifying the Certification Function of cras
2.2.3 Understanding the Regulatory Reliance on Credit Ratings
2.2.4 Mapping the Regulatory Use of Credit Ratings
Concluding Remarks

3 Reliance Versus Influence: A Roadmap toward the Risk of Over-Reliance
Introduction
3.1 Negative Effects of Rating Changes and the Role of Rating-Based Regulation
3.1.1 Downgrades, Rating Triggers and Liquidity Problems
3.1.2 Cliff-Edge Effects and Herd Behaviours
3.1.3 Systemic Risk and Spill-Over Effects Across Markets
3.1.4 Rating-Based Regulation and Its Implications: A Critical Review
Concluding Remarks

4 Over-Reliance on External Credit Ratings: In Search of a Meaning
Introduction
4.1 Understanding Over-Reliance on Credit Ratings
4.1.1 Detecting the Phenomenon: Over-Reliance in the US Pre-crisis Regulatory Debate on CRAs
4.1.2 Over-Reliance in the eu Pre-crisis Regulatory Debate on cras
4.1.3 The Sources of Over-Reliance: Rating-Based Regulation versus the Structured Finance Sector
4.1.4 Closing the Gap: Defining Over-Reliance on External Credit Ratings
Concluding Remarks

5 Regulatory Approaches at the National, International and Regional Levels to Address Over-Reliance on Credit Ratings
Introduction
5.1 The Evolution of the Regulatory Debate
5.1.1 US Level: Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act: Reliance versus Over-Reliance
5.1.2 The fsb Principles for Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings: Searching for Over-Reliance
5.1.3 The European cra Regulation iii: Confirming Over-Reliance
Concluding Remarks

6 Regulatory Approaches against Over-Reliance and Their Implementation
Introduction
6.1 In Search of Effectiveness
6.1.1 Normative Approaches in Focus
6.1.2 Implementation Process in Focus
6.2 The Status of the us Reforms under Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act
6.2.1 The Early Debate on Section 939A
6.2.2 us Federal Agencies Reform Processes
6.2.3 The us Reforms: A Critical Review in Relation to the Risk of Over-Reliance
6.3 The Status of the eu Reforms under the cra iii Regulation
6.3.1 The Work of the esas
6.3.2 The eba’s, Mandate
6.3.3 The esma’s Mandate
6.3.4 Perspectives on the eu Approach in the Future
6.4 The eu Approach: A Critical Review
6.5 A More Independent Credit Risk Analysis: From Theory to Practice
6.5.1 The Status of Implementation
6.5.2 The Second Level of the Approach: A Critical Review
Concluding Remarks

7 Reviewing the Debate on Over-Reliance and Approaches against it
Introduction
7.1 Credit Rating References and the ‘Official Seal of Approval’: What Has been Missed?
7.1.1 cra Market Failures and Regulatory Interventions
7.1.2 Evidence of Over-Reliance in the Structured Finance Sector
7.1.3 Evidence of Over-Reliance on Credit Rating Legislative References
7.2 Anticipating the Post-Crisis Debate on Over-Reliance
7.2.1 cra Message to the Regulators
7.2.2 cra Message to the Users of Credit Ratings
Concluding Remarks

8 Conclusions
8.1 Taking Stock of the Situation
8.2 Developing an Assertion into Certainty: Providing Evidence of Over-reliance
8.3 Encouraging More Dialogue and Coordination at All Levels
8.4 Ensuring More of a Level-Playing Field among Credit Risk Assessment Tools
8.5 Looking Ahead
Concluding Remarks

Bibliography
Index


Francesco De Pascalis, Ph.D. (2015) is lecturer in financial law at Brunel University London and associate research fellow at IALS University of London. He published several articles on the regulation of credit rating agencies in established journals, including Oxford Journals.



Ihre Fragen, Wünsche oder Anmerkungen
Vorname*
Nachname*
Ihre E-Mail-Adresse*
Kundennr.
Ihre Nachricht*
Lediglich mit * gekennzeichnete Felder sind Pflichtfelder.
Wenn Sie die im Kontaktformular eingegebenen Daten durch Klick auf den nachfolgenden Button übersenden, erklären Sie sich damit einverstanden, dass wir Ihr Angaben für die Beantwortung Ihrer Anfrage verwenden. Selbstverständlich werden Ihre Daten vertraulich behandelt und nicht an Dritte weitergegeben. Sie können der Verwendung Ihrer Daten jederzeit widersprechen. Das Datenhandling bei Sack Fachmedien erklären wir Ihnen in unserer Datenschutzerklärung.