Believing and Accepting

Softcover Nachdruck of the original 1. Auflage 2000
ISBN: 978-94-010-5782-0
Verlag: Springer Netherlands

Buch, Englisch, Band 83, 302 Seiten, Format (B × H): 160 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 501 g

Reihe: Philosophical Studies Series

(1) Beliefs are involuntary, and not nonnally subject to direct voluntary control. For instance I cannot believe at will that my trousers are on fire, or that the Dalai Lama is a living God, even if you pay me a large amount of money for believing such things. (2) Beliefs are nonnally shaped by evidence for what is believed, unless they are, in some sense, irrational. In general a belief is rational if it is proportioned to the degree of evidence that one has for its truth. In this sense, one often says that "beliefs aim at truth". This is why it is, on the face of it, irrational to believe against the evidence that one has. A subject whose beliefs are not shaped by a concern for their truth, but by what she wants to be the case, is more or less a wishful thinker or a self-deceiver. (3) Beliefs are context independent, in the sense that at one time a subject believes something or does not believe it; she does not believe it relative to one context and not relative to another. For instance if I believe that Paris is a polluted city, I cannot believe that on Monday and not on Tuesday; that would be a change of belief, or a change of mind, but not a case of believing one thing in one context and another thing in another context. If I believe something, the belief is more or 4 less pennanent across various contexts.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Engel, P.

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie
• Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaften Sprachphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction: the Varieties of Belief and Acceptance.- The Possibility of Acceptance Without Belief.- Why Acceptance that P Does Not Entail Belief that P.- Moore’s Paradox.- On Moore’s Paradox.- On Wanting to Believe.- Choosing to Intend, Wanting to Believe.- Transformations of Belief.- Belief and Acceptance: A Logical Point of View.- Scientific Objectivity and the Aims of Belief.- Belief and Acceptance Revisited.- Commitments Defined with the Help of Public Concepts.- Concepts, Beliefs and Metarepresentations.- The Simulation of Belief.