Essays on Frege’s Conception of Truth

Erscheinungsjahr 2007
ISBN: 978-90-420-2156-3
Verlag: Brill | Rodopi

Buch, Englisch, Band 75, 236 Seiten, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 435 g

Reihe: Grazer Philosophische Studien

In his writings on the foundations of logic, Gottlob Frege, the father of modern logic, sketched a conception of truth that focuses on the following questions: What is the sense of the word “true”? Is truth a definable concept or a primitive one? What are the kinds of things of which truth is predicated? What is the role of the concept of truth in judgment, assertion and recognition? What is the logical category of truth? What is the significance of the concept of truth for science in general and for logic in particular?
The present volume is dedicated to the interpretation, reconstruction and critical assessment of Frege’s conception of truth. It is of interest to all those working on Frege, the history of logic and semantics, or theories of truth. The volume brings together nine original papers whose authors are all widely known to Frege scholars. The main topics are: the role of the concept of truth in Frege’s system, the nature of the truth-values, the logical category of truth, the relationship between truth and judgment, and the conception of the truth-bearers.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Weitere Mitwirkende

Greimann, Dirk

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie Westliche Philosophie: 20./21. Jahrhundert
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophische Logik, Argumentationstheorie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction
Part I. Truth in Frege’s Formal System
Hans SLUGA: Truth and the Imperfection of Language
Richard G. HECK, Jr.: Frege and Semantics
Danielle MACBETH: Striving for Truth in the Practice of Mathematics: Kant and Frege
Part II. Truth and the Truth-Values
Michael BEANEY: Frege’s Use of Function-Argument Analysis and his Introduction of Truth-Values as Objects
Dirk GREIMANN: Did Frege Really Consider Truth as an Object?
Part III. Truth and Judgment
Erich H. RECK: Frege on Truth, Judgment, and Objectivity
Verena MAYER: Evidence, Judgment and Truth
Part IV. The Nature of the Truth-Bearers
Oswaldo CHATEAUBRIAND: The Truth of Thoughts: Variations on Fregean Themes
Marco RUFFINO: Fregean Propositions, Belief Preservation and Cognitive Value

Über Autor(innen)

Dirk Greimann received his doctorate from the University of Munich and is now Professor of Philosophy at the Federal University of Santa Maria in Brazil. His areas of specialization are the philosophy of language and logic, ontology, and the history of Analytic Philosophy, especially Frege, Tarski and Quine. He has extensively published in these areas and is currently working on a book dealing with the relationship between truth and assertoric force.