Friedman / Woodford Handbook of Monetary Economics

1. Auflage 2010
ISBN: 978-0-444-53455-2
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 968 Seiten

Reihe: Handbooks in Economics

What are the goals of monetary policy and how are they transmitted? Top scholars summarize recent evidence on the roles of money in the economy, the effects of information, and the growing importance of nonbank financial institutions. Their investigations lead to questions about standard presumptions about the rationality of asset markets and renewed interest in fiscal-monetary connections. Stopping short of advocating conclusions about the ideal conduct of policy, the authors focus instead on analytical methods and the changing interactions among the ingredients and properties that inform monetary models. The influences between economic performance and monetary policy regimes can be both grand and muted, and this volume clarifies the present state of this continually evolving relationship. - Presents extensive coverage of monetary policy theories with an eye toward questions raised by the recent financial crisis - Explores the ingredients, properties, and implications of models that inform monetary policy - Observes changes in the formulation of monetary policies over the last 25 years

Autoren/Hrsg.

Friedman, Benjamin M.

Woodford, Michael

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Handbook of Monetary Economics;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;6
5;INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES;3
6;Contributors;16
7;Preface;18
8;Part Four: Optimal Monetary Policy;24
8.1;Chapter 13. The Optimal Rate of Inflation;26
8.1.1;1. Introduction;27
8.1.2;2. Money Demand and the Optimal Rate of Inflation;31
8.1.3;3. Money Demand, Fiscal Policy and the Optimal Rate of Inflation;37
8.1.4;4. Failure of the Friedman Rule Due to Untaxed Income: Three Examples;40
8.1.5;5. A Foreign Demand For Domestic Currency and the Optimal Rate of Inflation;48
8.1.6;6. Sticky Prices and the Optimal Rate of Inflation;57
8.1.7;7. The Friedman Rule Versus Price-Stability Trade-Off;68
8.1.8;8. Does the Zero Bound Provide a Rationale for Positive Inflation Targets?;74
8.1.9;9. Downward Nominal Rigidity;77
8.1.10;10. Quality Bias and the Optimal Rate of Inflation;79
8.1.11;11. Conclusion;88
8.1.12;References;93
8.2;Chapter 14. Optimal Monetary Stabilization Policy;96
8.2.1;1. Introduction;97
8.2.2;2. Optimal Policy in a Canonical New Keynesian Model;99
8.2.3;3. Stabilization and Welfare;132
8.2.4;4. Generalizations of the Basic Model;163
8.2.5;5. Research Agenda;191
8.2.6;References;199
8.3;Chapter 15. Simple and Robust Rules for Monetary Policy;202
8.3.1;1. Introduction;203
8.3.2;2. Historical Background;203
8.3.3;3. Using Models to Evaluate Simple Policy Rules;206
8.3.4;4. Robustness of Policy Rules;217
8.3.5;5. Optimal Policy Versus Simple Rules;223
8.3.6;6. Learning from Experience Before, During and after the Great Moderation;225
8.3.7;7. Conclusion;228
8.3.8;References;229
8.4;Chapter 16. Optimal Monetary Policy in Open Economies;234
8.4.1;1. Introduction and Overview;235
8.4.2;2. Part I: Optimal Stabilization Policy and International Relative Prices with Frictionless Asset Markets;242
8.4.3;3. A Baseline Monetary Model of Macroeconomic Interdependence;243
8.4.4;4. The Classical View: Divine Coincidence in Open Economies;259
8.4.5;5. Skepticism on the Classical View: Local Currency Price Stability of Imports;267
8.4.6;6. Deviations from Policy Cooperation and Concerns with “Competitive Devaluations”;282
8.4.7;7. Part II: Currency Misalignments and Cross-Country Demand Imbalances;288
8.4.8;8. Macroeconomic Interdependence Under Asset Market Imperfections;288
8.4.9;9. Conclusions;301
8.4.10;References;302
9;Part Five: Constraints on Monetary Policy;307
9.1;Chapter 17. The Interaction Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy;308
9.1.1;1. Introduction;309
9.1.2;2. Positive Theory of Price Stability;310
9.1.3;3. Normative Theory of Price Stability: Is Price Stability Optimal?;346
9.1.4;References;368
9.2;Chapter 18. The Politics of Monetary Policy;374
9.2.1;1. Introduction;375
9.2.2;2. Rules Versus Discretion;376
9.2.3;3. Central Bank Independence;386
9.2.4;4. Political Business Cycles;400
9.2.5;5. Currency Unions;407
9.2.6;6. The Euro;414
9.2.7;7. Conclusion;419
9.2.8;References;423
9.3;Chapter 19. Inflation Expectations, Adaptive Learning and Optimal Monetary Policy;428
9.3.1;1. Introduction;429
9.3.2;2. Recent Developments in Private-Sector Inflation Expectations;432
9.3.3;3. A Simple New Keynesian Model of Inflation Dynamics Under Rational Expectations;434
9.3.4;4. Monetary Policy Rules And Stability Under Adaptive Learning;438
9.3.5;5. Optimal Monetary Policy Under Adaptive Learning;444
9.3.6;6. Some Further Reflections;462
9.3.7;7. Conclusions;464
9.3.8;References;465
9.4;Chapter 20. Wanting Robustness in Macroeconomics;470
9.4.1;1. Introduction;471
9.4.2;2. Knight, Savage, Ellsberg, Gilboa-Schmeidler, and Friedman;473
9.4.3;3. Formalizing a Taste for Robustness;478
9.4.4;4. Calibrating a Taste for Robustness;483
9.4.5;5. Learning;490
9.4.6;6. Robustness in Action;506
9.4.7;7. Concluding Remarks;521
9.4.8;References;528
10;Part Six: Monetary Policy in Practice;531
10.1;Chapter 21. Monetary Policy Regimes and Economic Performance: The Historical Record, 1979–2008;532
10.1.1;1. Introduction;533
10.1.2;2. Monetary Targetry, 1979–1982;541
10.1.3;3. Inflation Targets;556
10.1.4;4. The “Nice Years,” 1993–2006;558
10.1.5;5. Europe and the Transition to the Euro;577
10.1.6;6. Japan;582
10.1.7;7. Financial Stability and Monetary Policy During the Financial Crisis;589
10.1.8;8. Conclusions and Implications for Future Central Bank Policies;594
10.1.9;References;604
10.2;Chapter 22. Inflation Targeting;610
10.2.1;1. Introduction;611
10.2.2;2. History and Macroeconomic Effects;615
10.2.3;3. Theory;623
10.2.4;4. Practice;648
10.2.5;5. Future;659
10.2.6;References;668
10.3;Chapter 23. The Performance of Alternative Monetary Regimes;676
10.3.1;1. Introduction;677
10.3.2;2. Some Simple Evidence;679
10.3.3;3. Previous Work on Inflation Targeting;686
10.3.4;4. The Euro;691
10.3.5;5. The Role of Monetary Aggregates;698
10.3.6;6. Hard Currency Pegs;701
10.3.7;7. Conclusion;705
10.3.8;References;714
10.4;Chapter 24. Implementation of Monetary Policy: How Do Central Banks Set Interest Rates?;718
10.4.1;1. Introduction;719
10.4.2;2. Fundamental Issues in the Mode of Wicksell;726
10.4.3;3. The Traditional Understanding of “How they do that”;733
10.4.4;4. Observed Relationships Between Reserves and the Policy Interest Rate;748
10.4.5;5. How, Then, Do Central Banks Set Interest Rates?;758
10.4.6;6. Empirical Evidence on Reserve Demand and Supply within the Maintenance Period;772
10.4.7;7. New Possibilities Following the 2007–2009 Crisis;787
10.4.8;8. Conclusion;805
10.4.9;References;806
10.5;Chapter 25. Monetary Policy in Emerging Markets;812
10.5.1;1. Introduction;814
10.5.2;2. Why Do We Need Different Models for Emerging Markets?;816
10.5.3;3. Goods Markets, Pricing, and Devaluation;818
10.5.4;4. Inflation;826
10.5.5;5. Nominal Targets for Monetary Policy;829
10.5.6;6. Exchange Rate Regimes;834
10.5.7;7. Procyclicality;838
10.5.8;8. Capital Flows;845
10.5.9;9. Crises in Emerging Markets;854
10.5.10;10. Summary of Conclusions;871
10.5.11;References;872
11;Index-Volume 3B;894
12;Index-Volume 3A;934