Kuntz Conceptualising Transnational Corporate Groups for International Criminal Law

1. Auflage 2017
ISBN: 978-3-8452-8403-3
Verlag: Nomos
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, Band 31, 409 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 227 mm

Reihe: Schriften zum Internationalen und Europäischen Strafrecht

The volume offers a concept of transnational corporate groups for international criminal law. It thus fills a gap in the discussion about criminalising corporate behaviour. Drawing from international law, EU competition law, UK and US law and economic theory, it defines a transnational corporate group as an economic entity and thus potential addressee of international criminal law if the parent has the power to control its subsidiaries and it also exercises this power. The book adds a company law perspective. It provides a uniform, independent and economically sound concept of business entities, aiming at adding clarity as to what a transnational corporate group is and according to which criteria it may be defined. The criteria are derived from a comparative in-depth analysis of transnational, overarching structural elements found in main legal orders. They are synthesised in a detailed set of criteria emphasising and describing substantial and effective control mechanisms.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Kuntz, Marie

Fachgebiete

• Rechtswissenschaften Internationales Recht und Europarecht Internationales Recht Internationales Strafrecht, Internationales Verfahrensrecht

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Cover;1
2; Introduction;15
2.1;A. Research Question and State of Research;19
2.1.1;1. Status Quo in International Criminal Law;21
2.1.2;2. Discussion on Corporations;25
2.1.2.1;a. Origins: The Rome Conference;25
2.1.2.2;b. Focus on National Criminal Law Theory;29
2.1.2.3;c. No Definition of the Object of Regulation;32
2.1.3;3. Regulation Gap in National Law;34
2.1.4;4. General Premises for Definition;36
2.1.4.1;a. Independence from National Law;37
2.1.4.2;b. Principle of Complementarity;37
2.1.4.3;c. Criminal Law Premises;41
2.1.4.4;d. Summary;41
2.2;B. Structure;42
2.2.1;1. Links to Existing Legal Concepts;42
2.2.1.1;a. International Law;42
2.2.1.2;b. EU Competition Law;44
2.2.1.3;c. UK Law;45
2.2.1.4;d. US Alien Tort Statute;46
2.2.1.5;e. Comprehensive Analysis of Criteria;47
2.2.2;2. Economic Analysis;47
2.2.3;3. Case Study;48
2.3;C. Possible Use of the Concept;48
3;Chapter I: Transnational Corporate Groups in International Law;51
3.1;A. Transnational Corporate Groups as Subjects of International Law;52
3.1.1;1. Arguments Concerning a de lege lata InternationalLegal Personality;53
3.1.2;2. No Definition of the Object of Regulation;59
3.2;B. Transnational Corporate Groups in International Treaty Law;62
3.2.1;1. Human Rights Treaties;64
3.2.2;2. International Labour Law;67
3.2.3;3. International Environmental Law;68
3.2.4;4. Summary;71
3.3;C. Transnational Corporate Groups in International Investment Law;72
3.3.1;1. Investments of Transnational Corporate Groups;73
3.3.2;2. Determining the Investor’s Nationality;75
3.3.2.1;a. Bilateral Investment Treaties;75
3.3.2.2;b. Diplomatic Protection;77
3.3.3;3. Article 25 (2) b ICSID Convention;79
3.3.3.1;a. Consent to Apply Article 25 (2) b ICSID Convention;80
3.3.3.2;b. General Criteria for Control;81
3.3.3.3;c. Pyramidal Transnational Corporate Groups;82
3.3.3.4;d. Limits to Corporate Group Structure Arguments;86
3.3.4;4. Special Requirements in Bilateral Investment Treaties;88
3.3.5;5. Abuse in International Investment Law;90
3.3.6;6. Summary;92
3.4;D. Transnational Corporate Groups in Soft Law;93
3.4.1;1. UN Norms and the Special Representative;95
3.4.2;2. OECD Guidelines;104
3.4.3;3. ILO Tripartite Declaration;108
3.4.4;4. Summary;109
3.5;E. Summary;110
4;Chapter II: Transnational Corporate Groups in EU Competition Law;111
4.1;A. Corporate Groups as one Undertaking;113
4.2;B. Control as a Decisive Criterion;115
4.2.1;1. Control via Shareholdings;117
4.2.1.1;a. Presumption for Wholly Owned Subsidiaries;117
4.2.1.2;b. Other Shareholdings;122
4.2.2;2. Indicia for Decisive Influence;123
4.2.2.1;a. Involvement in Day-to-Day Business;124
4.2.2.2;b. Strategic Control;124
4.2.2.3;c. Integrated Business;127
4.2.2.4;d. Personnel Links;129
4.2.2.5;e. Unified Appearance;131
4.2.2.6;f. Reporting Obligations;132
4.2.3;3. Rebuttal;133
4.2.3.1;a. General Criteria;136
4.2.3.2;b. Successful Rebuttals;138
4.2.4;4. Summary;141
4.3;C. Consequences;142
4.3.1;1. A Corporate Group as a Perpetrator;143
4.3.2;2. Jurisdiction;148
4.3.3;3. Succession;149
4.3.4;4. Fines;152
4.3.5;5. Procedure;156
4.4;D. Summary;160
5;Chapter III: UK Law as a Counterapproach toEU Competition Law;163
5.1;A. Attribution of Acts and Knowledge to Corporations;164
5.2;B. The Rule: Separate Legal Personalities;167
5.2.1;1. The Salomon Principle;167
5.2.2;2. Transfer to Corporate Groups;168
5.3;C. The Exceptions;171
5.3.1;1. Single Entity;173
5.3.2;2. Piercing the Corporate Veil;178
5.3.3;3. Agency within Corporate Groups;184
5.3.4;4. Beneficial Ownership;187
5.3.5;5. Direct Duty of Parent;190
5.3.6;6. Interpretation of Contracts and Statutes;193
5.4;D. Summary;197
6;Chapter IV: US Approaches to Transnational Corporate Groups;203
6.1;A. Alien Torts Statute: Transnational Corporate Group Litigation;204
6.1.1;1. Subject Matter;206
6.1.2;2. Corporations as Potential Perpetrators;210
6.1.2.1;a. Private Actors;210
6.1.2.2;b. Corporations;212
6.1.3;3. Corporate Groups as Potential Perpetrators;216
6.1.3.1;a. General Standards;217
6.1.3.2;b. Agency;222
6.1.3.2.1;i. General Agency Test;222
6.1.3.2.2;ii. Parental Control;223
6.1.3.3;c. Alter Ego;226
6.1.3.4;d. Enterprise Theory;229
6.1.4;4. Transnational Reach of Corporate Groups;232
6.1.4.1;a. Territorial Jurisdiction;232
6.1.4.1.1;i. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality;233
6.1.4.1.2;ii. Rebuttal;235
6.1.4.2;b. Forum Non Conveniens;239
6.1.5;5. Summary;242
6.2;B. The Notion of Undertaking in US Antitrust Law;243
6.2.1;1. Group Privilege;244
6.2.2;2. Extension of Copperweld Jurisprudence;246
6.2.3;3. No Single Economic Entity Doctrine;248
7;Chapter V: Comprehensive Analysis of Criteria;253
8;Chapter VI: Transnational Corporate Groups in Economic andManagement Theory;259
8.1;A. Methodology and Terminology;259
8.2;B. Control as a Decisive Criterion;261
8.2.1;1. Transaction Cost Economics;262
8.2.2;2. Other Theories;267
8.2.3;3. Summary;270
8.3;C. Criteria of Control;271
8.3.1;1. Control via Shareholdings;271
8.3.2;2. Organisational Structure;274
8.3.2.1;a. Decentralisation;275
8.3.2.2;b. Relationships within Transnational Corporate Groups;279
8.3.3;3. Integrated Business;282
8.3.3.1;a. Vertical Integration;283
8.3.3.2;b. Horizontal Integration;287
8.3.4;4. Personnel Links;290
8.3.5;5. Unified Appearance;293
8.3.6;6. Reporting Obligations;295
8.3.7;7. Summary and Limitations;298
8.4;D. Corporate Groups and Limited Liability;301
8.4.1;1. Limited Liability: A Short Introduction;301
8.4.2;2. Corporate Groups;304
8.4.2.1;a. Fostering Innovation;305
8.4.2.2;b. Specific Risks;306
8.4.3;3. Summary;309
8.5;E. Summary;310
9;Chapter VII: Concept in Practice: A Brief Case Study;313
9.1;A. Material Allegations;313
9.2;B. Corporate Group Structure;314
9.3;C. Application of Set of Criteria;316
9.3.1;1. Power to Control;316
9.3.2;2. Exercise of Parental Control;316
9.3.2.1;a. Involvement in Day-to-Day Management;316
9.3.2.2;b. Strategic Control;317
9.3.2.3;c. Integrated Business;320
9.3.2.4;d. Personnel Links;322
9.3.2.5;e. Unified Appearance;324
9.3.2.6;f. Reporting Obligations;324
9.3.3;3. Result;325
10; Summary;327
11; Outlook: Consequences for International Criminal Law;337
12; Table of Cases;343
12.1; INTERNATIONAL CASES;343
12.1.1; PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE;343
12.1.2; INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE;343
12.1.3; NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROLCOUNCIL LAW NO. 10;343
12.1.4; INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT;344
12.1.5; INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMERYUGOSLAVIA;344
12.1.6; INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENTDISPUTES;344
12.1.7; UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE;346
12.1.8;AD HOC TRIBUNALS;347
12.2; EUROPEAN CASES;347
12.2.1; EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS;347
12.2.2; EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE;347
12.2.3; GENERAL COURT;354
12.2.4; EUROPEAN COMMISSION;359
12.3; NATIONAL CASES;363
12.3.1; AUSTRALIAN HIGH COURT;363
12.3.2; BUNDESGERICHTSHOF;363
12.3.3; BUNDESKARTELLAMT;363
12.3.4; HOUSE OF LORDS (UNITED KINGDOM);364
12.3.5; SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED KINGDO;364
12.3.6; PRIVY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM;365
12.3.7; HER MAJESTY'S COURT OF APPEAL IN ENGLAND,CIVIL DIVISION;365
12.3.8; HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND AND WALES;366
12.3.9; UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT;367
12.3.10; UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS;368
12.3.11; UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT;373
12.3.12; UNITED STATES STATE COURT;378
13; Bibliography;379