Unity, Truth and the Liar

The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox
1. Auflage. Softcover version of original hardcover Auflage 2008
ISBN: 978-90-481-7888-9
Verlag: Springer Netherlands

Buch, Englisch, Band 8, 338 Seiten, Previously published in hardcover, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 552 g

Reihe: Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science

Andinmy haste, I said: “Allmenare Liars” 1 —Psalms 116:11 The Original Lie Philosophical analysis often reveals and seldom solves paradoxes. To quote Stephen Read: A paradox arises when an unacceptable conclusion is supported by a plausible argument from apparently acceptable premises. [.] So three di?erent reactions to the paradoxes are possible: to show that the r- soning is fallacious; or that the premises are not true after all; or that 2 the conclusion can in fact be accepted. There are sometimes elaborate ways to endorse a paradoxical conc- sion. One might be prepared to concede that indeed there are a number of grains that make a heap, but no possibility to know this number. However, some paradoxes are more threatening than others; showing the conclusiontobeacceptableisnotaseriousoption,iftheacceptanceleads to triviality. Among semantic paradoxes, the Liar (in any of its versions) 3 o?ers as its conclusion a bullet no one would be willing to bite. One of the most famous versions of the Liar Paradox was proposed by Epimenides, though its attribution to the Cretan poet and philosopher has only a relatively recent history. It seems indeed that Epimenides was mentioned neither in ancient nor in medieval treatments of the Liar 1 Jewish Publication Society translation. 2 Read [1].

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Rahman, Shahid

Genot, Emmanuel

Tulenheimo, Tero

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaften Sprachphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophische Logik, Argumentationstheorie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sprachphilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Disputatio.- The Truth Schema and the Liar.- Read and Indirect Revenge.- Tarski's Hidden Theory of Meaning: Sentences Say Exactly One Thing.- Doubting Thomas: From Bradwardine Back to Anon.- Logic Without Truth.- Scheming and Lying.- Comments on Stephen Read's “The Truth-Schema and the Liar”.- Models for Liars in Bradwardine's Theory of Truth.- On a New Account of the Liar.- The Liar Cannot Be Solved.- Out of the Liar Tangle.- Read about T-Scheme.- Further Thoughts on Tarski's T-scheme and the Liar.- Historical Background: Restrictionism versus the Manifold Theory of Meaning.- Restrictionism: A Medieval Approach Revisited.- William Heytesbury and the Treatment of Insolubilia in Fourteenth-Century England Followed by a Critical Edition of Three Anonymous Treatises De Insolubilibus Inspired by Heytesbury.