E-Book, Deutsch, Band 41, 470 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 227 mm
Ratz International and European Law Problems of Investment Arbitration involving the EU
1. Auflage 2017
ISBN: 978-3-8452-8632-7
Verlag: Nomos
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
E-Book, Deutsch, Band 41, 470 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 227 mm
ISBN: 978-3-8452-8632-7
Verlag: Nomos
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Mit dieser Arbeit legt der Autor die erste monographische Behandlung der Frage vor, inwiefern völker- und europarechtliche Probleme dazu führen, dass Schiedsverfahren nach von der EU abgeschlossenen Investitionsschutzabkommen einen geringeren Schutzstandard gewähren als „reguläre“ BITs.
Der Autor gelangt zu dem Ergebnis, dass Schiedsverfahren nach EU-Investitionsschutzabkommen tatsächlich einen niedrigeren Schutzstandard gewähren.
Dies hängt mit Problemen der Vollstreckung von Schiedssprüchen und Unterschieden hinsichtlich der materiellen Verpflichtungen der EU und der Mitgliedstaaten zusammen, die zu Schutzlücken für Investoren führen. Der wichtigste Faktor ist allerdings die Rechtunsicherheit, die daraus resultiert, dass die in bisher von der EU abgeschlossenen Investitionsschutzabkommen enthaltenen Streitbeilegungsregeln nicht den Vorgaben des EuGH entsprechen.
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Rechtswissenschaften Internationales Recht und Europarecht Internationales Recht Internationales Zivilprozess- und Schiedsverfahrensrecht
- Rechtswissenschaften Internationales Recht und Europarecht Internationales Recht Internationales Handels-, Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsrecht
- Rechtswissenschaften Internationales Recht und Europarecht Europarecht Europäisches Handels-, Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsrecht, Währungsrecht
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Cover;1
2; 1. Introduction;29
2.1; 1.1 Relevance of the research topic;29
2.2; 1.2 Definition of the research question and key terms;30
2.2.1; 1.2.1 Definition of the research question;30
2.2.2; 1.2.2 Definitions of key terms;31
2.2.2.1; 1.2.2.1 “Investment agreement”;31
2.2.2.2; 1.2.2.2 “Implementation”, “compliance”, “enforcement” and “execution”;34
2.3; 1.3 Envisaged course of the analysis;35
2.4; 1.4 Envisaged style of the analysis;37
3; 2. Lack of protection due to problems relating to the binding nature of relevant legal obligations for the EU?;39
3.1; 2.1 The EU and customary international law;39
3.1.1; 2.1.1 Customary international law and investment law;40
3.1.2; 2.1.2 The binding nature of customary international law for the EU;43
3.1.2.1; 2.1.2.1 The principle of “equal sovereignty”;43
3.1.2.2; 2.1.2.2 The “consent theory”;44
3.1.2.3; 2.1.2.3 Relevant case-law;47
3.1.2.4; 2.1.2.4 General principles of law;49
3.1.2.5; 2.1.2.5 The “succession argument”;50
3.1.2.6; 2.1.2.6 Arguments based on art. 24 of the UN Charter, the emergence of customary rules on privileges of international organizations and the international legal personality of the EU;52
3.1.2.7; 2.1.2.7 International organizations as second-rate subjects of international law;54
3.1.2.8; 2.1.2.8 The concept of “estoppel”;57
3.1.2.9; 2.1.2.9 Result;57
3.2; 2.2 Mixed agreements: Union, Member State or joint responsibility;58
3.2.1; 2.2.1 The (prevailing) view that all parties to a mixed agreement are bound by all provisions of the agreement;62
3.2.2; 2.2.2 The view that not all parties to a mixed agreement are bound by all provisions of the agreement;65
3.2.3; 2.2.3 Distinguishing between international investment agreements that include references to the division of competences and international investment agreements that do not;71
3.2.3.1; 2.2.3.1 The “procedural approach” and the EC declaration to the ECT;73
3.3; 2.3 Excursus: Responsibility of EU Member States for non-compliance of other Member States with their obligations under mixed agreements;75
4; 3. Lack of protection due to ineffective mechanisms of attribution of conduct to the EU?;81
4.1; 3.1 Focus on the ILC draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations;81
4.2; 3.2 General rules on the attribution of wrongful conduct to international organizations;83
4.2.1; 3.2.1 Relevant provisions of the ILC draft articles and the “control link”;83
4.2.1.1; 3.2.1.1 International organizations assisting or directing member states in wrongful acts;87
4.2.1.2; 3.2.1.2 Double attributability;88
4.2.2; 3.2.2 The “institutional link” and the “territorial link”;89
4.2.3; 3.2.3 Relevant practice and case-law;91
4.2.3.1; 3.2.3.1 Case-law based on the control criterion;91
4.2.3.2; 3.2.3.2 Case law base not based on the control criterion;94
4.2.3.2.1; 3.2.3.2.1 The “transfer of control” theory;94
4.2.3.3; 3.2.3.3 From the “transfer of control” theory to the member states’ or the international organization’s institutional responsibility?;98
4.3; 3.3 EU responsibility for the conduct of EU organs;100
4.4; 3.4 The four scenarios of potential EU responsibility for the conduct of EU Member States;100
4.4.1; 3.4.1 EU responsibility for the implementation of EU legislation by Member States;101
4.4.1.1; 3.4.1.1 Member State organs as EU organs? Voices in the literature;101
4.4.1.2; 3.4.1.2 Relevant case law;103
4.4.1.3; 3.4.1.3 ILC draft articles;107
4.4.1.4; 3.4.1.4 Result;111
4.4.2; 3.4.2 EU responsibility for the “incorrect” implementation of EU legislation by Member States;112
4.4.3; 3.4.3 EU responsibility for the enactment and implementation of legislation by EU Member States when EU legislation grants discretion to the Member States concerning its implementation;113
4.4.4; 3.4.4 EU responsibility for the enactment and implementation of legislation by EU Member States when there is no relevant EU legislation;113
4.4.5; 3.4.5 EU Financial Responsibility Regulation;114
4.4.5.1; 3.4.5.1 The substantive provisions of the Financial Responsibility Regulation;115
4.4.5.2; 3.4.5.2 The Financial Responsibility Regulation and the autonomy of the EU legal order;121
4.5; 3.5 Member States, but not the EU being bound by international law – responsibility gap 1?;125
4.5.1; 3.5.1 The hierarchy between international law and EU law from an international law perspective;126
4.5.2; 3.5.2 The hierarchy between international law and EU law from a European law perspective;129
4.5.2.1; 3.5.2.1 Obligations of the EU under international law;129
4.5.2.1.1; 3.5.2.1.1 Preliminary result;134
4.5.2.1.2; 3.5.2.1.2 Kadi and Solange;134
4.5.2.1.2.1; 3.5.2.1.2.1 Kadi: Case summary;135
4.5.2.1.2.2; 3.5.2.1.2.2 Kadi and Solange: Analysis;137
4.5.2.1.3; 3.5.2.1.3 The position of international law in the EU legal order after Kadi;141
4.5.2.2; 3.5.2.2 Obligations of the EU Member States;142
4.5.3; 3.5.3 Result;145
4.5.3.1; 3.5.3.1 How should Member States deal with arbitral awards that find Member States to have violated international law in order to comply with EU law?;146
4.6; 3.6 The EU, but not Member States being bound by international law – responsibility gap 2?;149
5; 4. Lack of protection due to ineffective dispute settlement mechanisms?;153
5.1; 4.1 Dispute settlement mechanisms provided for in “traditional” BITs;153
5.1.1; 4.1.1 State-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms;156
5.1.2; 4.1.2 Investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms;159
5.2; 4.2 Dispute settlement mechanisms provided for in EU IIAs;161
5.2.1; 4.2.1 Historical development of EU approach to dispute settlement in IIAs: From diplomatic to legalistic;161
5.2.1.1; 4.2.1.1 Explanations for the shift of EU preferences from political to legalistic dispute settlement;163
5.2.2; 4.2.2 Three types of relevant EU agreements: trade and association agreements, ECT and full-fledged investment agreements;166
5.2.3; 4.2.3 State-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms in EU IIAs;168
5.2.3.1; 4.2.3.1 State-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms in EU trade and association agreements;168
5.2.3.1.1; 4.2.3.1.1 Historical development;172
5.2.3.2; 4.2.3.2 State-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms in full-fledged EU IIAs;176
5.2.3.2.1; 4.2.3.2.1 Singapore;176
5.2.3.2.2; 4.2.3.2.2 CETA;179
5.2.3.3; 4.2.3.3 State-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms under the ECT;181
5.2.3.4; 4.2.3.4 Duty of cooperation as a limitation to the right to initiate SSDS?;183
5.2.4; 4.2.4 Investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms under EU IIAs;184
5.2.4.1; 4.2.4.1 In the absence of ISDS under EU trade and association agreements: Seeking redress for investors under EU trade and association agreements.;185
5.2.4.1.1; 4.2.4.1.1 Availability of state-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms?;185
5.2.4.1.2; 4.2.4.1.2 Exercise of diplomatic protection?;186
5.2.4.1.3; 4.2.4.1.3 Having recourse to courts?;190
5.2.4.2; 4.2.4.2 Investor-to-state dispute settlement in full-fledged EU IIAs;191
5.2.4.2.1; 4.2.4.2.1 Availability of arbitration fora;191
5.2.4.2.2; 4.2.4.2.2 Singapore;196
5.2.4.2.3; 4.2.4.2.3 CETA;202
5.2.4.3; 4.2.4.3 Investor-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms under the Energy Charter Treaty;216
5.2.4.3.1; 4.2.4.3.1 EU cases under the ECT – why have no claims been brought against the EU under the ECT?;219
5.2.4.3.2; 4.2.4.3.2 Admissibility of claims of EU investors against the EU?;219
5.2.4.3.3; 4.2.4.3.3 Alleged unlawful conduct;222
5.2.4.3.4; 4.2.4.3.4 Availability of arbitration fora;230
5.2.4.3.5; 4.2.4.3.5 Tactical reasons;230
5.3; 4.3 Result;231
5.3.1; 4.3.1 SSDS;231
5.3.1.1; 4.3.1.1 SSDS in “classical” BITs vs SSDS in the ECT;231
5.3.1.2; 4.3.1.2 SSDS in “classical” BITs vs SSDS in EU trade and association agreements;231
5.3.1.3; 4.3.1.3 SSDS in “classical” BITs vs SSDS in full-fledged EU IIAs;233
5.3.2; 4.3.2 ISDS;233
5.3.2.1; 4.3.2.1 ISDS in “classical” BITs vs ISDS in the ECT;234
5.3.2.2; 4.3.2.2 ISDS in “classical” BITs vs ISDS in full-fledged EU IIAs;234
5.3.2.2.1; 4.3.2.2.1 Singapore;235
5.3.2.2.2; 4.3.2.2.2 CETA;239
5.3.2.2.3; 4.3.2.2.3 Result;242
5.4; 4.4 The EU approach to investor-to-state dispute settlement;243
5.4.1; 4.4.1 Is there such a thing as an EU approach to investor-to-state dispute settlement?;243
5.4.1.1; 4.4.1.1 Pre-CETA: A genuinely European (EU) approach or a general trend?;243
5.4.1.2; 4.4.1.2 The EU-CETA approach to investor-to-state dispute settlement;245
5.4.2; 4.4.2 Explaining the EU approach to ISDS;246
5.4.2.1; 4.4.2.1 Criticism against ISDS;246
5.4.2.2; 4.4.2.2 Driving force behind the pre-CETA EU approach to ISDS;255
5.4.2.3; 4.4.2.3 Will the EU approach do the trick?;259
5.4.2.3.1; 4.4.2.3.1 Could the pre-CETA approach have done the trick?;259
5.4.2.3.2; 4.4.2.3.2 Will the EU-CETA approach do the trick?;264
6; 5. Lack of protection due to ineffective enforcement mechanisms?;267
6.1; 5.1 Enforcement of awards issued pursuant to “classical” BITs;267
6.1.1; 5.1.1 Enforcement of awards made in investor-to-state proceedings pursuant to “classical” BITs;267
6.1.2; 5.1.2 Enforcement of awards made in state-to-state proceedings pursuant to “classical” BITs;270
6.2; 5.2 Enforcement of awards made in EU trade and association agreements;271
6.2.1; 5.2.1 Enforcement of awards made in state-to-state proceedings pursuant to EU trade and association agreements;271
6.2.2; 5.2.2 Relationship of enforcement mechanisms provided for under EU trade and association agreements with enforcement mechanisms available under general international law;273
6.2.2.1; 5.2.2.1 Self-help measures as a means of enforcing international responsibility (of international organizations);279
6.2.2.2; 5.2.2.2 Self-help measures as a means of enforcing the international responsibility of the EU;283
6.3; 5.3 Enforcement of awards issued pursuant to full-fledged EU IIAs;288
6.3.1; 5.3.1 Enforcement of awards made in state-to-state proceedings pursuant to EU IIAs;288
6.3.1.1; 5.3.1.1 Singapore;288
6.3.1.2; 5.3.1.2 CETA;288
6.3.2; 5.3.2 Enforcement of awards made in investor-to-state proceedings pursuant to EU IIAs;289
6.3.2.1; 5.3.2.1 Singapore;289
6.3.2.2; 5.3.2.2 CETA;289
6.4; 5.4 Applicability of the New York Convention;290
6.4.1; 5.4.1 Arguments in favor of the applicability of the New York Convention;290
6.4.2; 5.4.2 Arguments against the applicability of the New York Convention;292
6.4.2.1; 5.4.2.1 The EU as a “legal person” within the meaning of art. 1 para. 1 of the New York Convention?;292
6.4.2.1.1; 5.4.2.1.1 The reciprocity argument pursuant to art. 14 of the New York Convention;294
6.4.2.2; 5.4.2.2 Applicability of the New York Convention to arbitral awards issued by the CJEU in disputes involving the EU;297
6.4.2.3; 5.4.2.3 Conclusion and recommendation for bilateral agreements to solve enforceability issues;299
6.4.2.3.1; 5.4.2.3.1 Remaining issues with bilateral agreements as the solution to enforceability issues;300
6.4.2.4; 5.4.2.4 Grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement under the New York Convention;302
6.5; 5.5 “State immunity”;303
6.5.1; 5.5.1 Immunity of international organizations?;303
6.5.2; 5.5.2 Existence of EU assets abroad that could be confiscated?;307
6.5.3; 5.5.3 Potential solutions to enforcement issues due to the immunity of the EU;309
6.6; 5.6 Enforcement of awards issued pursuant to the ECT;310
6.6.1; 5.6.1 Enforcement of awards made in state-to-state proceedings pursuant to the ECT;310
6.6.2; 5.6.2 Enforcement of awards made in investor-to-state proceedings pursuant to the ECT;311
6.7; 5.7 Result;311
6.7.1; 5.7.1 Enforcement of “classical” SSDS-awards vs. enforcement of SSDS-awards under EU trade and association agreements;311
6.7.2; 5.7.2 Enforcement under “classical” arbitral awards vs. enforcement under full-fledged EU IIAs;313
6.7.2.1; 5.7.2.1 Enforcement of awards made in investor-to-state dispute settlement proceedings;313
6.7.2.2; 5.7.2.2 Enforcement of arbitral awards made in state-to-state dispute settlement proceedings;314
6.7.3; 5.7.3 Enforcement under “classical” arbitral awards vs. enforcement under the ECT;315
6.7.3.1; 5.7.3.1 Enforcement of arbitral awards made in investor-to-state dispute settlement proceedings;315
6.7.3.2; 5.7.3.2 Enforcement of arbitral awards made in state-to-state dispute settlement proceedings;315
7; 6. Lack of protection due to EU IIAs not being compatible with the case law of the cjeu?;317
7.1; 6.1 Constitutional principles of the EU legal order;318
7.2; 6.2 Opinion 1/91;321
7.2.1; 6.2.1 Case summary;321
7.2.2; 6.2.2 Analysis;323
7.2.2.1; 6.2.2.1 Interpretation of internal competences by arbitral tribunals;323
7.2.2.2; 6.2.2.2 Interpretation of EU law by arbitral tribunals;324
7.2.2.3; 6.2.2.3 Spillover effects;331
7.2.2.3.1; 6.2.2.3.1 De jure spillover effects;331
7.2.2.3.2; 6.2.2.3.2 De facto spillover effects;334
7.2.2.3.2.1; 6.2.2.3.2.1 By-passing of the CJEU in the case of overlapping provisions;335
7.2.2.3.2.2; 6.2.2.3.2.2 Limitation of remedies to the payment of damages;336
7.2.2.3.2.3; 6.2.2.3.2.3 Preliminary result;337
7.2.2.4; 6.2.2.4 Result;338
7.3; 6.3 Kadi;339
7.3.1; 6.3.1 Respect for human rights as a condition for the lawfulness of Community acts;339
7.3.2; 6.3.2 Relevant human rights and relevance of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR;341
7.3.3; 6.3.3 Art. 6 of the ECHR;343
7.3.3.1; 6.3.3.1 Applicability of art. 6 of the ECHR to arbitration proceedings;343
7.3.3.2; 6.3.3.2 The impact of art. 6 of the ECHR on arbitration proceedings;346
7.3.4; 6.3.4 Art. 47 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights;351
7.4; 6.4 Opinion 1/00;353
7.4.1; 6.4.1 Case summary;353
7.4.2; 6.4.2 Analysis;354
7.5; 6.5 Mox Plant;356
7.5.1; 6.5.1 Case summary;356
7.5.2; 6.5.2 Analysis;357
7.6; 6.6 Opinion 1/09;361
7.6.1; 6.6.1 Case summary;361
7.6.2; 6.6.2 Analysis;362
7.6.2.1; 6.6.2.1 The importance of the preliminary ruling procedure;362
7.6.2.2; 6.6.2.2 Requirements for arbitral tribunals to be in a position to request a preliminary ruling from an EU law perspective;364
7.6.2.2.1; 6.6.2.2.1 Compulsory jurisdiction;365
7.6.2.2.2; 6.6.2.2.2 “Sufficiently close link”;368
7.6.2.2.3; 6.6.2.2.3 Other key criteria, including permanency;370
7.6.2.2.4; 6.6.2.2.4 Conclusion;372
7.6.2.3; 6.6.2.3 Tribunals “of a Member State” – requests for preliminary rulings from arbitral tribunals whose seat is outside of the EU?;372
7.6.2.4; 6.6.2.4 Permissibility of making requests for preliminary rulings from the tribunal’s perspective;375
7.6.2.5; 6.6.2.5 Providing for an obligation of arbitral tribunals to request a preliminary ruling – the nature of the functioning of the CJEU;376
7.6.2.6; 6.6.2.6 “Exhaustion of local remedies” as a substitute for preliminary reference procedure?;378
7.6.2.7; 6.6.2.7 National courts as “ordinary courts” and the “quantitative argument” made in Opinion 1/09;378
7.6.2.8; 6.6.2.8 Result;380
7.7; 6.7 Fiamm and Fedon and the potential de-facto-undermining of the EU legal order;381
7.7.1; 6.7.1 Case Summary;381
7.7.2; 6.7.2 Analysis;383
7.7.2.1; 6.7.2.1 EU liability regime: requirements and “fault” as a requirement;384
7.7.2.2; 6.7.2.2 The EU liability regime as a part of EU constitutional law?;387
7.7.2.3; 6.7.2.3 De facto undermining of the EU legal order;389
7.7.2.3.1; 6.7.2.3.1 De facto suspension of EU law by way of indemnification?;389
7.7.2.3.2; 6.7.2.3.2 De facto suspension of EU law by way of suspension of EU liability regime?;390
7.7.2.3.3; 6.7.2.3.3 Result;392
7.8; 6.8 Opinion 2/94;392
7.8.1; 6.8.1 Case summary;392
7.8.2; 6.8.2 Analysis;393
7.9; 6.9 Opinion 2/13;393
7.9.1; 6.9.1 Case Summary;394
7.9.2; 6.9.2 Analysis;394
7.10; 6.10 Preliminary result and summary of the guidelines developed by the CJEU;402
7.10.1; 6.10.1 Summary of the guidelines developed by the CJEU;402
7.10.1.1; 6.10.1.1 The allocation of tasks and competences to the institutions of the Union, including the system of judicial supervision, as foreseen in the Treaties must not be affected.;404
7.10.1.2; 6.10.1.2 The uniform interpretation of Union law throughout the Union must be secured.;406
7.10.1.3; 6.10.1.3 Dispute settlement mechanisms must be structured in a way that protects relevant fundamental rights in the light of relevant CJEU jurisprudence.;407
7.11; 6.11 Compatibility of dispute settlement mechanisms in EU IIAs with the guidelines developed by the CJEU;408
7.11.1; 6.11.1 Compatibility of dispute settlement mechanisms in EU trade and association agreements with the guidelines developed by the CJEU;408
7.11.2; 6.11.2 Compatibility of the ECT with the relevant guidelines developed by the CJEU;411
7.11.2.1; 6.11.2.1 Applicability of the relevant guidelines developed by the CJEU to the ECT;411
7.11.2.2; 6.11.2.2 Compatibility of the ECT with the relevant guidelines developed by the CJEU;412
7.11.2.3; 6.11.2.3 Early Commission warnings about the ECT not being compatible with EU law;418
7.11.2.4; 6.11.2.4 Result;419
7.11.3; 6.11.3 Compatibility of dispute settlement mechanisms in full-fledged EU investment agreements with the guidelines developed by the CJEU;420
7.11.3.1; 6.11.3.1 Singapore;420
7.11.3.2; 6.11.3.2 CETA;422
7.12; 6.12 Impact of the CJEU’s relevant case law on negotiations with third parties and potential approaches to remedy the situation;425
7.12.1; 6.12.1 Likelihood of third parties accepting the requirements developed by the CJEU;425
7.12.2; 6.12.2 Potential solutions not requiring an amendment of the European Treaties;427
7.12.2.1; 6.12.2.1 Separating the internal dimension of disputes from their external dimension?;427
7.12.2.2; 6.12.2.2 More defensive approach to be taken by the CJEU?;429
7.12.2.3; 6.12.2.3 Special chambers within the CJEU, expansion of direct rights of action before / of the jurisdiction of the CJEU, stand-alone European investment court?;430
7.12.2.4; 6.12.2.4 Purely international law basis for dispute settlement / “Multi-level governance” approach;431
7.12.2.5; 6.12.2.5 Dispute settlement within the framework of the CFSP?;434
7.12.2.6; 6.12.2.6 State-to-State dispute settlement only?;435
7.12.3; 6.12.3 Proposal for an amendment of the European Treaties in order to overcome the resistance of the CJEU;436
7.13; 6.13 Excursus: Potential consequences of the EU approach to ISDS on arbitration as a form of peaceful dispute settlement;438
8; 7. Conclusion;443
9; Bibliography;447
