Rosentreter | Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Principle of Systemic Integration in International Investment Law and Arbitration | E-Book | sack.de
E-Book

E-Book, Englisch, Band 4, 512 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 227 mm

Reihe: Luxemburger Juristische Studien - Luxembourg Legal Studies

Rosentreter Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Principle of Systemic Integration in International Investment Law and Arbitration


1. Auflage 2015
ISBN: 978-3-8452-6238-3
Verlag: Nomos
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, Band 4, 512 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 227 mm

Reihe: Luxemburger Juristische Studien - Luxembourg Legal Studies

ISBN: 978-3-8452-6238-3
Verlag: Nomos
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)



The treatise gives scholars and practitioners useful guidance for resolving the key issues of contemporary investment law (i.e. how best to balance investor’s rights to investment protection and host states’ rights to regulate) by applying Article 31(3)(c) VCLT and the so-called ‘Principle of Systemic Integration’.

It illustrates the potential and limits of harmonious treaty interpretation. For this purpose, it demonstrates the relevance of extraneous rules in the system of international investment law and arbitration, deals extensively with the interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, and explains in depth the ‘principle of systemic integration’. The author critically analysis – at the example of the FET standard, the prohibition of unlawful expropriation and the various non-discrimination provisions in investment treaties – how investment tribunals and international courts have interpreted investment treaties in the light of extraneous rules of international law.

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1;Cover;1
2; Introduction;24
2.1; The phenomenon of fragmentation in international law;26
2.2; International investment law and arbitration;29
3; Part I – The system of international investment law & arbitration and extraneous rules of international law;36
3.1; Chapter 1: The Relevance of Extraneous Rules in the System of International Investment Law & Arbitration;38
3.1.1; A. Introduction;38
3.1.2; B. The system of international investment law & arbitration;39
3.1.2.1; I. The sources of international investment rights and obligations;39
3.1.2.2; II. The basic structure and contents of IIAs;41
3.1.2.2.1; 1. Preamble – a reference to the object and purpose of IIAs;41
3.1.2.2.2; 2. Definition of investment;42
3.1.2.2.3; 3. Exceptions: taxation and essential security interests;44
3.1.2.2.4; 4. Substantive rights;45
3.1.2.2.4.1; (a) Fair and equitable treatment;46
3.1.2.2.4.2; (b) Expropriation;47
3.1.2.2.4.3; (c) National treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment;49
3.1.2.2.4.4; (d) Arbitrary or discriminatory measures;51
3.1.2.2.5; 5. Wider considerations in investment treaties;55
3.1.2.2.6; 6. Further aspects of investment treaties;57
3.1.2.3; III. Dispute settlement in international investment law;59
3.1.2.3.1; 1. Investor-state arbitration;59
3.1.2.3.2; 2. State to state disputes;60
3.1.2.3.3; 3. The characteristics and advantages of international arbitration;61
3.1.2.3.4; 4. The limited jurisdiction of investment tribunals;67
3.1.2.3.4.1; (a) Jurisdiction ratione materiae;67
3.1.2.3.4.2; (b) Jurisdiction ratione personae;73
3.1.2.3.5; 5. Extraneous rules as applicable law in investment disputes;74
3.1.2.3.5.1; (a) Procedural law;74
3.1.2.3.5.2; (b) Investment treaties;75
3.1.3; C. The relevance of extraneous rules;79
3.1.3.1; I. Extraneous rules of general international law;80
3.1.3.2; II. Extraneous rules of international law dealing with the same or similar subject-matter as investment treaty provisions;82
3.1.3.3; III. Extraneous rules of international law not dealing with the same or similar subject-matter as investment treaty provisions;89
3.1.4; D. Conclusion;91
4; Part II -?? Article 31(3)(c) vclt and the ‘principle of systemic integration’;94
4.1; Chapter 2: The Elements of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT;96
4.1.1; A. Introduction;96
4.1.2; B. ‘Any rules of international law’;97
4.1.2.1; I. ‘Any rules of international law’ as a reference to the formal sources of international law;97
4.1.2.2; II. ‘Any rules of international law’ as a reference to all sources of international law;100
4.1.2.2.1; 1. Customary law;100
4.1.2.2.2; 2. General principles of law;101
4.1.2.2.3; 3. Treaties;104
4.1.2.2.4; 4. Other sources of law;111
4.1.2.3; III. ‘Any rules of international law’ and non-binding instruments;112
4.1.2.4; IV. Conclusion;115
4.1.3; C The temporal scope of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT;115
4.1.3.1; I. The principle of contemporaneity and the inter-temporal law;116
4.1.3.1.1; 1. The principle of contemporaneity;116
4.1.3.1.2; 2. The inter-temporal law;119
4.1.3.2; II. The interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT;122
4.1.3.2.1; 1. The general rule of treaty interpretation;122
4.1.3.2.2; 2. The drafting history of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT;124
4.1.3.2.2.1; Discussion in the ILC, 728th and 729th meeting – 21 and 22 May 1964;125
4.1.3.2.2.1.1; Discussion in the ILC, 765th meeting – 14 July 1964;135
4.1.3.2.2.1.2; Discussion in the ILC, 767th meeting – 16 July 1964;136
4.1.3.2.2.1.3; Redraft of the articles on the interpretation of treaties and introduction of Article 69 A;138
4.1.3.2.2.1.4; Discussion in the ILC, 769th and 770th meeting – 17 and 20 July 1964;139
4.1.3.2.2.1.5; Comments by Governments and Waldock’s observations thereto;142
4.1.3.2.2.1.6; Redraft of Article 69(I)(b) and the discussion in the ILC, 870th and 871st meeting – 15 and 16 June 1966;145
4.1.3.2.2.1.7; The United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties;147
4.1.3.2.3; 3. Conclusion on the interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT;148
4.1.3.3; III. The temporal element in general international law;149
4.1.3.4; IV. Conclusion;156
4.1.4; D. ‘Relevant’;158
4.1.4.1; I. ‘Relevant’ as reference to ‘the same subject-matter’;158
4.1.4.2; II. The wording, context and object and purpose of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT;160
4.1.4.3; III. The drafting history of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT;161
4.1.4.4; IV. Conclusion;162
4.1.5; E. ‘Applicable in the relations between the parties’;162
4.1.5.1; I. Views and merits;165
4.1.5.1.1; 1. The narrow interpretation: all treaty parties;165
4.1.5.1.2; 2. The divergent interpretation: the parties to a dispute or treaty;168
4.1.5.1.3; 3. The broad interpretation: one of the parties to a dispute;169
4.1.5.2; II. Limits to treaty interpretation;170
4.1.5.2.1; 1. The object and purpose of the treaty;171
4.1.5.2.2; 2. The pacta tertiis principle;173
4.1.5.3; III. Legal analysis;176
4.1.5.3.1; 1. Wording;176
4.1.5.3.2; 2. Context;180
4.1.5.3.3; 3. The principle of effectiveness;185
4.1.5.3.4; 4. The drafting history of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT;194
4.1.5.4; IV. Conclusion;196
4.1.6; F. ‘There shall be taken into account, together with the context:’;197
4.1.6.1; I. Relevant rules of international law in treaty interpretation;198
4.1.6.1.1; 1. The terms used in the treaty have a well-recognized meaning in customary international law;198
4.1.6.1.2; 2. The terms of the treaty are by their nature open-textured and reference to other sources of international law will assist in giving content to the rule;200
4.1.6.1.3; 3. Treaty rule is unclear and its meaning is determined by reference to a developed body of international law;201
4.1.6.2; II. Legal restrictions on the impact of relevant rules on treaty interpretation;203
4.1.6.2.1; 1. Express derogation from other relevant rules;204
4.1.6.2.2; 2. Wording;205
4.1.6.2.3; 3. Different implementation mechanisms;206
4.1.6.2.3.1; (a) Limited jurisdiction of an international tribunal;206
4.1.6.2.3.2; (b) Different organizational structures between regime of the treaty under interpretation and regime of the referred rule;213
4.1.6.2.4; 4. Inter-organization principle of good neighbourliness (‘Störungsverbot’);214
4.1.6.3; III. The interpretative weight of relevant rules of international law;214
4.1.6.4; IV. Conclusion;215
4.1.7; G. Conclusion;216
4.2; Chapter 3: The ‘Principle of Systemic Integration’ and other Elements of Treaty Interpretation;218
4.2.1; A. Introduction;218
4.2.2; B. Ordinary and special meaning, Article 31(1) and (4) VCLT;218
4.2.2.1; I. Explicit references;218
4.2.2.2; II. Specialized or technical meaning;222
4.2.2.3; III. Special meaning;226
4.2.2.4; IV. Conclusion;228
4.2.3; C. Subsequent agreement and subsequent practice, Article 31(3)(a) and (b) VCLT;229
4.2.3.1; I. Subsequent agreements;230
4.2.3.2; II. Subsequent practice;235
4.2.3.3; III. Conclusion;243
4.2.4; D. Conclusion;244
5; Part III – Article 31(3)(c) vclt and the ‘principle of systemic integration’ in investment law & arbitration;246
5.1; Chapter 4: The interpretation of investment treaties;248
5.1.1; A. Introduction;248
5.1.2; B. Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT;248
5.1.3; C. The authority of precedents in investment arbitration;257
5.1.4; D. Article 31(3)(c) VCLT in investment arbitration;259
5.1.5; E. The private law model of investment treaty arbitration: procedural implications on the interpretation of investment treaties in the light of other relevant rules of international law;263
5.1.5.1; I. Party autonomy as the guiding principle in investment arbitration;264
5.1.5.2; II. The (non-)invocation of extraneous rules by the disputing parties;267
5.1.5.3; III. The discontinuation of proceedings;269
5.1.5.3.1; 1. Foresti v. South Africa;270
5.1.5.3.2; 2. Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia;271
5.1.5.4; IV. The invocation of extraneous rules by third parties;273
5.1.5.4.1; 1. Amicus curiae in investor-state arbitration;273
5.1.5.4.2; 2. The limited impact of amicus submissions on final awards of investment tribunals;277
5.1.5.5; V. The role of the arbitral tribunal;280
5.1.6; F. Conclusion;281
5.2; Chapter 5: The Interpretation of Investment Treaties and Extraneous Rules of General International Law;284
5.2.1; A. Introduction;284
5.2.2; B. The interpretation of investment treaties in the light of general international law;285
5.2.2.1; I. The gap-filling function of general international law;285
5.2.2.2; II. The elucidation of undefined treaty terms by reference to general international law;288
5.2.3; C. Treaty provisions as lex specialis and references to general international law;290
5.2.3.1; I. Loewen v. United States and the requirement to exhaust local remedies;291
5.2.3.2; II. The Argentina cases and the essential security interests clause in Article XI US-Argentina BIT;293
5.2.4; D. Conclusion;302
5.3; Chapter 6: The Interpretation of Investment Treaties and Extraneous Rules of International Law of the Same Subject-Matter;306
5.3.1; A. Introduction;306
5.3.2; B. References to customary international law and general principles of law;307
5.3.2.1; I. The interpretation of FET;307
5.3.2.1.1; 1. FET linked to international law;307
5.3.2.1.2; 2. FET as free-standing standard;314
5.3.2.1.3; 3. Conclusion;316
5.3.2.2; II. The interpretation of the prohibition of unlawful expropriation;316
5.3.2.3; III. Issues relating to treaty interpretation in light of customary international law;320
5.3.2.3.1; 1. Identifying the existence and content of rules of international investment law;320
5.3.2.3.2; 2. The influence of IIAs on customary international law;327
5.3.2.3.2.1; (a) IIAs as contributor to the development of customary international law;329
5.3.2.3.2.2; (b) IIAs as quid pro quos;331
5.3.3; C. References to extraneous treaty provisions;334
5.3.3.1; I. The interpretation of non-discrimination provisions in light of international trade law;335
5.3.3.1.1; 1. The ‘like circumstances’ criterion;336
5.3.3.1.1.1; (a) ‘Like circumstances’ as key element of non-discrimination provisions in IIAs;336
5.3.3.1.1.2; (b) ‘Like circumstances’ as operative element or exception;340
5.3.3.1.2; 2. Less favourable treatment;344
5.3.3.1.3; 3. Application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions;347
5.3.3.1.4; 4. Conclusion;349
5.3.3.2; II. The protection from unlawful expropriation and the human right to property;350
5.3.3.2.1; 1. Lauder v. Czech Republic;350
5.3.3.2.2; 2. Tecmed v. Mexico;352
5.3.3.2.3; 3. Azurix v. Argentina;354
5.3.3.2.4; 4. Saipem v. Bangladesh;355
5.3.3.2.5; 5. Conclusion;356
5.3.3.3; III. Limitations on references to extraneous treaty rules: the example of non-discrimination provisions in investment treaties and in international trade law;357
5.3.4; D. Conclusion;361
5.4; Chapter 7: The Interpretation of Investment Treaties and Extraneous Rules of International Law not of the Same Subject-Matter – Article 31(3)(C) VCLT and the ‘Principle of Systemic Integration’ – A Means to Reconcile Apparent Norm Conflicts in International Investment Law?;364
5.4.1; A. Introduction;364
5.4.2; B. Norm conflicts in international investment law;365
5.4.2.1; I. Norm conflicts and conflict resolution techniques in international law;365
5.4.2.2; II. Norm conflicts in international investment law – a case study;366
5.4.2.2.1; 1. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentina;367
5.4.2.2.1.1; (a) Case facts and investor claims;367
5.4.2.2.1.2; (b) The human rights context of the dispute and Argentina’s obligations under international law;368
5.4.2.2.1.3; (c) The arguments made by Argentina and the amici in the light of Argentina’s human rights obligations;374
5.4.2.2.1.4; (d) The tribunal’s decision;375
5.4.2.2.2; 2. Glamis Gold v. United States of America;377
5.4.2.2.2.1; (a) Case facts and investor claims;377
5.4.2.2.2.2; (b) The international law context of the dispute;378
5.4.2.2.2.3; (c) The arguments raised by the United States and the amicus curiae;380
5.4.2.2.2.4; (d) The tribunal’s decision;382
5.4.2.2.3; 3. Sempra v. Argentina;383
5.4.2.2.3.1; (a) Case facts and investor claims;383
5.4.2.2.3.2; (b) The arguments made by Argentina;384
5.4.2.2.3.3; (c) The tribunal’s decision;384
5.4.2.2.4; 4. UPS v. Canada;385
5.4.2.2.4.1; (a) Case facts and investor claims;385
5.4.2.2.4.2; (b) The tribunal’s decision;385
5.4.2.2.5; 5. Siemens v. Argentina;386
5.4.2.2.5.1; (a) Case facts and investor claim;386
5.4.2.2.5.2; (b) Argentina’s arguments;386
5.4.2.2.5.3; (c) The tribunal’s decision;386
5.4.2.2.6; 6. Azurix v. Argentina;387
5.4.2.2.6.1; (a) Case facts and investor claim;387
5.4.2.2.6.2; (b) Argentina’s arguments;387
5.4.2.2.6.3; (c) The tribunal’s decision;388
5.4.2.2.7; 7. S. D. Myers v. Canada;388
5.4.2.2.7.1; (a) Case facts and investor claims;388
5.4.2.2.7.2; (b) Canada’s arguments;389
5.4.2.2.7.3; (c) The international law context of the dispute;390
5.4.2.2.7.4; (d) The tribunal’s decision;392
5.4.2.2.8; 8. Conclusion;392
5.4.3; C. The entry points for and relevance of extraneous rules of international law in the interpretation of investment treaties;393
5.4.3.1; I. General exception clauses and extraneous rules;394
5.4.3.2; II. Non-discrimination provisions and extraneous rules;396
5.4.3.2.1; 1. Specific exception clauses relating to non-discriminatory provisions;396
5.4.3.2.2; 2. Public policy considerations and the ‘like circumstances’ requirement;397
5.4.3.3; III. The protection from unlawful expropriation and extraneous rules;405
5.4.3.3.1; 1. Direct expropriations;405
5.4.3.3.2; 2. Indirect expropriations and non compensable regulatory measures;406
5.4.3.3.2.1; (a) ‘Sole effects doctrine’;406
5.4.3.3.2.2; (b) Police powers doctrine;414
5.4.3.3.2.3; (c) State’s right to regulate – margin of appreciation and the principle of proportionality;421
5.4.3.3.2.4; (d) The interpretative impact of extraneous rules according to the different doctrines;426
5.4.3.3.3; 3. Lawfulness;427
5.4.3.3.4; 4. Compensation;428
5.4.3.3.4.1; Case facts and investor claims;434
5.4.3.3.4.2; The international law context of the dispute;435
5.4.3.3.4.3; The arguments made by Egypt and SPP;435
5.4.3.3.4.4; The tribunal’s decision;436
5.4.3.4; IV. The fair and equitable treatment standard and extraneous rules;438
5.4.3.4.1; 1. ‘A stable legal and business framework’;442
5.4.3.4.2; 2. Legitimate expectations subject to qualifying requirements;444
5.4.3.5; V. Conclusion;450
5.4.4; D. Norm conflict avoidance by harmonious interpretation in international investment law;451
5.4.5; E. Conclusion;456
6; Conclusion;458
7; Table of treaties and legal documents;464
8; Table of cases;474
9; Bibliography;494



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