The Environment and Externality

Erscheinungsjahr 2020
ISBN: 978-1-108-70830-2
Verlag: Cambridge University Press

Buch, Englisch, 350 Seiten, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 228 mm, Gewicht: 414 g

This innovative book models pollution mitigation as a negative externality whilst also providing desirable and useful solutions, such as establishing the triangular equivalence relationship among the Lindahl equilibrium without transfers, the Nash bargaining solution with the payoffs of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium as the status quo point, and the social optimum under the Lindahl weights. By introducing programming algorithms to validate these relationships numerically, Zili Yang bridges the gap between analytical results and empirical modelling, ultimately solving the Lindahl equilibrium and hybrid Nash equilibria in the influential RICE model. This text demonstrates the complexity and variety of environment externality problems, ranging from mixed externality to correlated externalities to environmental externality under IRS and policy applications. Integrating theory, algorithms and applications in a comprehensive framework, The Environment and Externality will benefit scholars and students working across environmental, resource and climate change economics.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Yang, Zili

Fachgebiete

• Rechtswissenschaften Öffentliches Recht Energierecht
• Geowissenschaften Umweltwissenschaften Umweltpolitik, Umweltprotokoll
• Rechtswissenschaften Öffentliches Recht Umweltrecht Umweltrecht allg., Technikrecht, Immissionsschutzrecht
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Umweltökonomie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. The environment and externality – an overview; 2. Modeling pollution as an externality provision problem; 3. Analytical results – general equilibrium; 4. Analytical results – strategic provision; 5. Extensions; 6. Applications; Epilogue.

Über Autor(innen)

Yang, Zili
Zili Yang is Professor of Economics at the State University of New York at Binghamton. He has collaborated with Professor William Nordhaus, winner of the 2018 Nobel Prize for Economics, on the development of the RICE model. He is the author of Strategic Bargaining and Cooperation in Greenhouse Gas Mitigations (The MIT Press, 2008).